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		<title>Case Summaries: N.C. Court of Appeals (May 21, 2025)</title>
		<link>https://www.disabilityandrepresentation.com/nc-legal-news/case-summaries-n-c-court-of-appeals-may-21-2025/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Phipps]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 May 2025 12:54:23 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.disabilityandrepresentation.com/?p=82351</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on May 21, 2025. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present. Indirect criminal contempt proceeding is similar to a criminal trial, but is not [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on May 21, 2025. These summaries will be added to <a href="https://www.sog.unc.edu/sccc/">Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium</a>, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.<span id="more-19985"></span></p>
<p><strong>Indirect criminal contempt proceeding is similar to a criminal trial, but is not a misdemeanor subject to statute of limitations. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=43874">State Board of Examiners of Plumbing, Heating and Fire Sprinkler Contractors v. Hudson</a>, COA24-136, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 21, 2025). In this Burke County case, defendant appealed the order holding him in indirect criminal contempt, arguing error in denying his motion to dismiss, lack of jurisdiction, and that the statute of limitations barred the contempt proceeding. The Court of Appeals found no error and affirmed the order.</p>
<p>In 2001, the State Board of Examiners of Plumbing, Heating, and Fire Sprinkler Contractors (State Board) obtained an injunction against defendant barring him from engaging in any plumbing, heating, or fire sprinkler business without a license from the State Board. Over the years, the State Board investigated complaints against defendant, most recently in 2021 where investigators turned up evidence defendant performed work on an HVAC unit. After a show cause hearing in 2023, the trial court entered an order holding defendant in indirect criminal contempt for violating the injunction. The trial court initially issued an oral ruling and filed a form document titled “Order in Indirect Criminal Contempt Proceeding” in July 2023. This was followed in August 2023 by the “Order of Contempt and Order of Arrest” with findings of fact and conclusions of law.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeals first established the applicable standard for review on the motion to dismiss, noting that indirect criminal contempt proceedings are similar to normal criminal trials and “a show-cause order in a criminal contempt proceeding, while not ‘equivalent’ to a criminal indictment is ‘akin’ to one.” Slip Op. at 8 (cleaned up). The court determined the substantial evidence standard was appropriate and reviewed the trial court’s order de novo, finding substantial evidence to support denying defendant’s motion.</p>
<p>The court next considered defendant’s argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Defendant initially filed an appeal after the July 2023 oral ruling and form document order, which he argued deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to enter the later August 2023 order. The court disagreed, explaining the July ruling and form did not represent a final judgment or appealable interlocutory order. Instead, the order from August “was the trial court’s final judgment,” as it was file-stamped and “included the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to [G.S.] 5A-15(f).” <em>Id</em>. at 16-17.</p>
<p>Finally, defendant argued that indirect criminal contempt was barred by the two-year statute of limitations on misdemeanors in G.S. 15-1. The court disagreed that the misdemeanor statute of limitations applied, explaining “criminal contempt is not tantamount to a traditional ‘crime.’” <em>Id</em>. at 23. To support this reasoning, the court explained the nature of criminal contempt, and pointed to <em>State v. Burrow</em>, 248 N.C. App. 663, 670 (2016), where the court had previously held “a criminal contempt adjudication is <em>not a misdemeanor</em> in North Carolina.” Slip Op. at 24. The court also noted that the contempt provisions are in G.S. Chapter 5A, not in G.S. Chapter 14 with the majority of other penal statutes, and Chapter 5A contains no statute of limitations.</p>
<p><strong>Trial court erred when holding defendant in direct criminal contempt for testing positive for a controlled substance before entering a plea. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44347">State v. Aspiote</a>, COA24-298, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 21, 2025). In this Carteret County case, defendant appealed the order holding him in direct criminal contempt, arguing error by the trial court. The Court of Appeals agreed, reversing and remanding for further proceedings.</p>
<p>In July 2023, defendant appeared in Superior Court to plead guilty to charges from a 2022 crime. Defendant answered “yes” to the question asking if he was using or consuming alcohol or drugs, telling the trial court he consumed some that morning before the hearing, but that his mind was clear. Defendant never told the trial court the type of substance he consumed. The trial court ordered defendant to take a urine test, and the test returned a positive for methamphetamine. At that point, the trial court declared it would not accept defendant’s plea and held defendant in direct criminal contempt for delaying the proceedings.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeals noted that while the trial court’s order was predicated on defendant’s delay of the proceedings because he tested positive, “nowhere in the record does it show that Defendant ever represented to the trial judge he would not test positive for a controlling substance.” Slip Op. at 5. Additionally, “the record does not show <em>the type</em> of substance Defendant ingested <em>on the morning of the hearing</em>.” <em>Id</em>. at 6. Since there was no evidence of delay in the trial court’s presence, defendant’s actions could not form the basis of <em>direct</em> criminal contempt. The court also specifically noted that delay waiting for defendant to take the urine sample could not support direct contempt “as Defendant’s act in providing the sample took place outside the presence of the court.” <em>Id</em>.</p>
<p><strong>(1) Expressing alignment with the sheriff was unusual but not error; (2) admitting bloody clothing was not error; (3) forensic download of phone was admitted with proper foundation; (4) State’s closing arguments were proper. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44372">State v. Joyner</a>, COA24-438, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 21, 2025). In this Hertford County case, defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing error in (1) the trial court’s remarks to the jury expressing alignment with the sheriff’s office, (2) admitting the victim’s bloody clothing as evidence, (3) admitting a forensic download of defendant’s phone, and (4) failing to intervene <em>ex mero motu</em> during the State’s closing. The Court of Appeals found no error.</p>
<p>In February of 2021, defendant confronted his ex-girlfriend and her new boyfriend at the boyfriend’s house. After an argument and physical confrontation, defendant and the new boyfriend started fighting. Eventually defendant pulled out his gun and shot the boyfriend eight times, killing him. During jury selection for the trial, the trial court introduced the sheriff of Hertford County to the potential jurors, and “[t]hroughout the rest of the five-day trial, the trial court thanked the jurors for their service ‘on behalf of the Sheriff’ approximately sixteen times.” Slip Op. at 7. During trial, the State offered the bloody shirt, shorts, and pants of the victim as an exhibit to demonstrate where the victim was shot. The State also offered a forensic download of defendant’s phone to show the calls and texts between defendant and his ex-girlfriend.</p>
<p>Taking up (1), the Court of Appeals explained that while the trial court’s choice to introduce and repeatedly reference the sheriff “was more than usual in this case, we cannot say that the trial court made an improper ‘expression of judicial leaning.’” <em>Id</em>. at 7. Even if the remarks represented error, overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt meant he could not show prejudicial error.</p>
<p>Moving to (2), the court noted that the bloody clothing was not excessively displayed or discussed in a way that would create unfair prejudice. As a result, under Rule of Evidence 403 “the probative value of [the victim’s] bloody clothing was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” <em>Id</em>. at 10.</p>
<p>In (3), the court dispensed with defendant’s argument that the State did not lay a proper foundation under Rule of Evidence 901, pointing to the testimony of a sergeant that he “examined Defendant’s phone and performed the forensic extraction of the phone.” <em>Id</em>. at 11. Although defendant contended the testimony lacked information on when the extraction was performed and what method was used, the court explained that “[a]ll that is required under Rule 901 is that a witness with knowledge about the evidence in question testifies that ‘the matter in question is what its proponent claims.’” <em>Id</em>. at12.</p>
<p>Finally, in (4), the court explained that defendant did not object to a statement he subsequently asserted was erroneously-admitted hearsay, and failed to assert that it was plain error to admit the hearsay on appeal. As a result, the State’s closing argument was based on a properly admitted statement and defendant’s argument failed.</p>
<p><strong>Trial court erred by not informing defendant he could withdraw his plea when the court imposed a sentence greater than the plea agreement. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44323">State v. Latta</a>, COA24-407, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 21, 2025). In this Durham County case, defendant appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea agreement to robbery and kidnapping charges. The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.</p>
<p>In 2002, defendant entered a plea agreement conditioned on his testimony against a co-defendant, receiving an active sentence of 61 to 83 months as a prior record level I. However, defendant failed to appear at the sentencing hearing, and disappeared from North Carolina for 20 years, picking up several criminal convictions in other states during the interim. Defendant was subsequently arrested in Vance County in 2022 for possession of a controlled substance, and transferred back to Durham County, where his previous charges were reinstated. At trial, defendant filed a motion to set aside his plea agreement, which the trial court denied, and defendant was sentenced as a prior record level IV in the mitigated range of 71 to 95 months.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeals considered whether it was error to deny defendant’s motion before the trial court pronounced a sentence, and whether defendant should have had an opportunity to withdraw his plea after the trial court imposed a sentence greater than defendant had agreed to in the original plea. The court concluded that there was no error beforehand, as “there is no evidence to indicate that Defendant ever asserted legal innocence, nor was there evidence of incompetent counsel or misunderstanding of what a guilty plea entails.” Slip Op. at 4. However, afterwards there was error, as G.S. 15A-1024 allows a defendant to withdraw a plea as a matter of right when a trial court imposes a sentence greater than agreed to by the defendant. The court explained that “[a]lthough the sentencing occurred during the same hearing that Defendant separately moved to withdraw the guilty plea, the trial judge did not inform Defendant that he may withdraw his plea because the sentencing would be different than that which he agreed to.” <em>Id</em>. at 6. On remand, the court directed that the defendant either be sentenced to a term within his original plea agreement, or be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his plea if the trial court determined a greater sentence was warranted.</p>
<p><strong>(1) Testimony from defendant’s ex-wife was properly admitted under Rule 404(b); (2) prosecutor’s statements asking jury to place themselves in the victim’s shoes were improper but not prejudicial; (3) trial court’s delay signing appellate documents was not prejudicial. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44588">State v. Maney</a>, COA24-894, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 21, 2025). In this Jackson County case, defendant appealed his convictions for numerous sexual offenses against a child, arguing error in (1) admitting improper evidence under Rule of Evidence 404(b), (2) allowing the State to make improper prejudicial statements, and (3) failing to sign documents requisite to defendant’s appeal. The Court of Appeals found no error.</p>
<p>The charges against defendant arose from years of sexual abuse directed at his daughter and was corroborated by testimony from his ex-wife, who was also subject to sexual abuse by defendant. Before trial in 2020, defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude portions of his ex-wife’s testimony, but did not object to the portions of testimony at trial that subsequently formed the basis of his appeal. During closing arguments, the prosecutor asked the jury to place themselves in the shoes of the minor victim several times; defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s comments. After trial, the trial court delayed for 19 months in signing the required appellate entries, as the trial court judge retired without signing the documents.</p>
<p>Taking up (1), the Court of Appeals walked through the various testimony from defendant’s ex-wife that he found objectionable, based around defendant’s threats to harm her, urging her to have an abortion, holding a knife and gun to her head, and other threatening acts towards her and her baby. Here the court found justification for admission under Rule 404(b), as the testimony “was probative of numerous aspects of the State’s case because it added context and illustrated Defendant’s state of mind when victimizing members of his family.” Slip Op. at 8. The court walked through the probative nature of the behavior, also noting that “a rational jury could have questioned why [the ex-wife] failed to report the abuse, thereby undermining her testimony about the rape, but the State utilized the challenged testimony to illustrate Defendant’s erratic, violent, and threatening behavior to explain [the ex-wife’s] failure to report the abuse.” <em>Id</em>. at 9. As the acts were substantially similar to the crimes charged, and admitting the testimony did not unfairly prejudice defendant, the court found no error in allowing the testimony.</p>
<p>Moving to (2), the court noted that under <em>State v. McCollum</em>, 334 N.C. 208 (1993), the prosecutor’s statements were improper, as a prosecutor cannot ask the jury to place themselves in the place of the victim. However, due to the overwhelming evidence against defendant, “they did not prejudice Defendant to the level necessary to warrant a new trial.” Slip Op. at 18.</p>
<p>For (3), the court looked to the four-factor test from <em>Barker v. Wingo</em>, 407 U.S 514 (1972), to determine if the delay in defendant’s appeal amounted to a prejudicial violation. As a delay of more than one year is presumptively prejudicial, the court continued to the analysis in the other three factors. The court noted that it was not clear that the delay was intentional due to the trial judge’s retirement. Defendant did not urge his appeal after the initial filing, weighing against him in the analysis. Additionally, the court saw no harm to defendant’s appellate arguments or preparation. As a result, the court concluded defendant was not prejudiced by the delay and found no merit in his appeal.</p>
<p>Judge Arrowood concurred only in the result.</p>
<p><strong>Driving into a construction zone and striking an officer represented sufficient evidence of reckless driving; jury’s request for clarification did not show jury instructions were confusing. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44418">State v. Montgomery</a>, COA24-291, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 21, 2025). In this Forsyth County case, defendant appealed his conviction for felonious operation of a motor vehicle to elude arrest, arguing error in (1) denying his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence and (2) providing a confusing jury instruction. The Court of Appeals found no error.</p>
<p>In August of 2020, defendant drove his truck into a closed lane where construction workers were paving a highway. An officer was present doing lane control, and he attempted to stop defendant; at first, defendant slowed to a stop, but then began driving away as the officer ran to keep up with him. Defendant eventually ran over the officer’s foot and hit the officer with the front fender of his truck as he reversed out of the area. Construction workers took a picture of defendant’s license plate, allowing law enforcement to locate and charge him with eluding arrest. At trial, defendant stipulated that his license was revoked, meaning the State only had to prove one aggravating factor, that defendant was driving recklessly, to elevate the charge from a misdemeanor to a felony.</p>
<p>Taking up (1), the Court of Appeals disagreed with defendant that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he was driving recklessly to support the charge. The court pointed to the series of events after defendant drove into the construction area, as he “drove into a lane closed to regular traffic where multiple construction workers were working on foot and another worker was actively operating a paving machine” and then “drove his truck in reverse in the construction zone, going the wrong direction, increasing his speed as he drove.” Slip Op. at 6. Ultimately defendant struck the officer while backing out of the construction area, showing willful disregard for the safety of everyone present.</p>
<p>Reaching (2), the court explained that the trial court laid out the stipulation and the necessary issue the State had to prove in a statement to the jury, then provided the pattern jury instruction for the charge. After this, the jury asked for clarification between felony and misdemeanor, but the court noted “its inquiry does not render the trial court’s instructions erroneous.” <em>Id</em>. at10. Ultimately the court concluded “[t]aken as a whole, the trial court’s instruction to the jury on felonious operation of a motor vehicle to elude arrest is correct.” <em>Id</em>. at 11.</p>
<p><strong>(1) No error in providing a self-defense instruction that referenced disqualifying felonies; (2) no error in allowing detective to testify regarding trajectory of bullets using wooden dowels; (3) detective’s lay opinion testimony did not require notification under G.S. 15A-903(a)(2). </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44348">State v. Townsend</a>, COA24-431, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 21, 2025). In this Guilford County case, defendant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing error in (1) instructing the jury on self-defense, (2) admitting testimony from a detective, and (3) failure to consider the detective’s testimony subject to disclosure under G.S. 15A-903(a)(2). The Court of Appeals found no error.</p>
<p>In October of 2017, defendant went to the apartment of the victim to buy marijuana, and shot the victim while he was preparing to sell to defendant. The detective at issue on appeal investigated the scene, examining the bullet holes in the wall to determine the trajectory of the shots. During the trial, the detective testified regarding photographs from the scene showing dowel rods in the bullet holes, and he used the dowel rods to demonstrate the trajectory of the bullets. However, the detective also acknowledged he was not an expert in ballistics or bullet trajectory. Defense counsel objected to this testimony, but was overruled. When instructing the jury, the trial court included a self-defense instruction including a statement that self-defense is not available to a defendant attempting to commit or committing a felony, and that “the State must prove ‘an immediate causal nexus between the Defendant’s use of force and felony conduct used to disqualify the Defendant from use of defensive force.’” Slip Op. at 4. When providing this instruction, the trial court told the jury that “attempting to possess two ounces of marijuana and attempting to possess any amount of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver are felonies.” <em>Id</em>.</p>
<p>In (1), defendant argued that possessing marijuana could not be a disqualifying felony for self-defense. The Court of Appeals disagreed, looking to <em>State v. McLymore</em>, 380 N.C. 185 (2022), and explaining the causal nexus requirement is a jury question. Here, the jury instructions “closely follow[ed] the guidance set forth in <em>McLymore</em> regarding the causal nexus requirement, including expressly articulating the State’s burden to prove but-for causation between Defendant’s felonious conduct and the confrontation resulting in [the victim’s] death.” Slip Op. at 9.</p>
<p>For (2), defendant argued admitting the detective’s testimony regarding the trajectory of the bullets was error as he was not qualified under Rule of Evidence 702. The court explained that neither party had provided cases on whether lay testimony under Rule 701 may cover bullet trajectories, requiring the court to consider precedent from other states. After surveying relevant caselaw, the court explained that the detective’s testimony was based on observations and techniques appropriate for lay testimony, and the fact that he was law enforcement did not convert it to expert testimony.</p>
<p>Reaching (3), the court explained that “because we conclude [the detective’s] testimony was lay opinion testimony, Section 15A-903(a)(2) does not apply.” <em>Id</em>. at 14. The court disagreed with defendant’s assertion that the detective’s testimony could be expert opinions under <em>State v. Davis</em>, 368 N.C. 794 (2016), noting the witness in this case was not offered as an expert at trial and “his testimony regarding the trajectory of the bullets was lay opinion testimony.” <em>Id</em>. at 15.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/case-summaries-n-c-court-of-appeals-may-21-2025/">Case Summaries: N.C. Court of Appeals (May 21, 2025)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu">North Carolina Criminal Law</a>.</p>
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		<title>Case Summaries: N.C. Court of Appeals (May 7, 2025)</title>
		<link>https://www.disabilityandrepresentation.com/personal-injury-lawyer/case-summaries-n-c-court-of-appeals-may-7-2025/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Phipps]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 12 May 2025 13:50:16 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[North Carolina]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Personal Injury Lawyer]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.disabilityandrepresentation.com/?p=77973</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on May 7, 2025. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present. Prosecutor’s statements during closing argument were not improper and did not comment on [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on May 7, 2025. These summaries will be added to <a href="https://www.sog.unc.edu/sccc/">Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium</a>, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.<span id="more-19872"></span></p>
<p><strong>Prosecutor’s statements during closing argument were not improper and did not comment on defendant’s choice not to testify. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44387">State v. Brown</a>, COA24-500, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 7, 2025). In this New Hanover County case, defendant appealed her convictions for felony breaking and entering, making a harassing phone call, and communicating threats, arguing several errors related to the State’s closing argument. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding no error.</p>
<p>In 2021, defendant and the victim were both romantically involved with the same man, leading to several incidents where defendant harassed the victim. In April of 2022, defendant entered the victim’s apartment while she was away, taking a laptop, TVs, and a handgun, and trashing the apartment. Afterwards, defendant sent the victim threatening texts, and when the victim called her number, defendant harassed her, and even called back after the victim hung up to communicate threats to her. At trial, defendant objected to two statements by the prosecutor during closing argument, but the trial court overruled the objections.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeals first considered the two statements defense counsel objected to during closing, that defendant would likely still threaten the victim today, and an expression of opinion regarding the evidence. The court found no abuse of discretion allowing both statements, as the State presented overwhelming evidence and the remarks could not have prejudiced defendant.</p>
<p>Defendant next argued error in failing to intervene <em>ex mero motu</em> when the State made “flagrantly impermissible” remarks during the closing. Slip Op. at 10. Because defendant did not object, the review was for gross impropriety, a high bar that defendant’s arguments could not meet.</p>
<p>Finally, defendant argued a violation of her constitutional rights as she asserted the prosecution commented on her failure to testify. The court again disagreed, explaining that “[t]he State did not comment on defendant’s failure to testify but did comment on defendant’s failure to produce [the male romantic partner] as a witness.” <em>Id</em>. at 14 (cleaned up). This did not represent an improper comment on defendant’s right against self-incrimination, and the court found no error.</p>
<p><strong>Statute criminalizing possession of a firearm by a felon not facially unconstitutional and not unconstitutional as applied to defendant. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44469">State v. Ducker</a>, COA24-373, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 7, 2025). In this Buncombe County case, defendant appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, arguing G.S. 14-415.1 was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and Article I, § 30 of the North Carolina Constitution. The Court of Appeals found no error and affirmed the judgment.</p>
<p>Defendant was arrested in 2022 after the Buncombe County Sheriff’s Department received a report that he was openly carrying a handgun despite a felony conviction. At trial in 2023, defendant raised constitutional arguments, but the trial court denied his motion.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeals considered defendant’s issues in three parts, whether G.S. 14-415.1 was (1) facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, (2) unconstitutional as applied to defendant under the Second Amendment, or (3) unconstitutional as applied to defendant under the North Carolina Constitution. In (1), the court noted it had previously upheld G.S. 14-415.1 as constitutional under the analysis required by <em>N.Y. State Rifle &amp; Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen</em>, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), in the recent decision <em>State v. Nanes</em>, ___ N.C. App. ___, 912 S.E.2d 202 (2025). This previous decision, along with consistent federal court decisions, supported the court’s holding that G.S. 14-415.1 “is facially constitutional under both the United States and the North Carolina Constitutions.” Slip Op. at 8.</p>
<p>In (2), the court explained <em>Nanes</em> did not control as the defendant in that case was convicted of a different predicate felony. However, the court rejected the idea that it would be required to conduct a felony-by-felony analysis, pointing to the decision in <em>State v. Fernandez</em>, 256 N.C. App. 539 (2017), that “as-applied challenges to Section 14-415.1 [are] universally unavailing because convicted felons fall outside of the protections of the Second Amendment.” Slip Op. at 9-10. The court noted that the Fourth Circuit had revisited this issue post-<em>Bruen</em> in <em>United States v. Hunt</em>, 123 F.4th 697 (2024), and reached the same conclusion. As a result, the court concluded “[b]ecause we agree with the Fourth Circuit . . . we are bound by our decision in <em>Fernandez</em> and continue to hold Section 14-415.1 regulates conduct outside of the Second Amendment’s protections.” Slip Op. at 12.</p>
<p>Finally, in (3), the court explained that under <em>Britt v. State</em>, 363 N.C. 546 (2009), a five-factor analysis is required to “determine if a convicted felon can be constitutionally disarmed under [G.S.] 14-415.1.” Slip Op. at 13. After walking through the <em>Britt</em> factors in defendant’s case, the court concluded G.S. 14-415.1 was constitutional when applied to defendant, as “[i]t is not unreasonable to disarm an individual who was convicted of a felony, subsequently violated a domestic violence protective order, and chose to continue to carry a firearm in violation of the law.” <em>Id</em>. at 17-18.</p>
<p><strong>Disagreement between defense counsel and defendant over strategy did not represent absolute impasse. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=43914">State v. Henderson</a>, COA24-223, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 7, 2025). In this Mecklenburg County case, defendant appealed his convictions for carrying a concealed gun, possession of a firearm by a felon, and having attained habitual felon status, arguing (1) error in failing to instruct defense counsel when an absolute impasse occurred; (2) failing to declare a mistrial <em>ex mero motu</em>; and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals found no error in (1)-(2), and dismissed without prejudice the ineffective assistance claim.</p>
<p>In October of 2021, defendant was pulled over by Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police after officers determined defendant had an outstanding warrant for a parole violation. During the traffic stop, officers frisked defendant and found a .38 revolver in his pocket. A passenger was in the vehicle, and one officer’s body-worn camera captured a conversation with the passenger. This video later became the subject of an agreement between defense counsel and the State to mute the video due to the hearsay discussion between the officer and the passenger. When discussing this agreement, defense counsel informed the trial court that defendant disagreed with the strategy and wanted all of the video to be heard. At one point defendant expressed the desire to speak to the trial court, and the trial court cautioned defendant that he should first discuss his issues with defense counsel. Excerpts of the transcript for this discussion appear on pages 6-9 of the slip opinion.</p>
<p>Taking up (1), the Court of Appeals explained that defense counsel wanted the video muted because it referenced defendant’s parole violation, while defendant wanted the video unmuted because the passenger said “no” when asked if she knew defendant “had that gun on him the whole time.” Slip Op. at 13. The court did not see an absolute impasse based on the record, noting that defense counsel alerted the trial court and defendant had an opportunity to discuss issues with counsel after the colloquy with the trial court. The court concluded “[t]his record shows an initial disagreement between Defendant and his defense counsel, but not an ‘absolute impasse.’” <em>Id</em>. at 15.</p>
<p>Moving to (2), defendant argued it was error not to declare a mistrial after the State introduced inadmissible evidence that defendant had suspected marijuana and a stack of temporary license plates. The court dispensed with this argument by noting defendant did not object at trial, and did not specifically content plain error, meaning he abandoned the argument.</p>
<p>For (3), the court concluded it could not determine the ineffective assistance of counsel claim “based on the cold record” and dismissed without prejudice to permit a motion for appropriate relief in the trial court. <em>Id</em>. at 18.</p>
<p><strong>Defense counsel’s <em>Harbison</em> error justified new trial. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44182">State v. Meadows</a>, COA24-149, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 7, 2025). In this Duplin County case, defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel by conceding his guilt without permission. The Court of Appeals majority agreed, vacating defendant’s convictions and remanding for a new trial.</p>
<p>In July of 2016, officers responded to the report of a break-in and gunshot injuries. Defendant was indicted for the break-in and shooting of the victim and came to trial in March 2023. Before and during the trial, defendant attempted to get new counsel three times, but each attempt was denied by the trial court. During trial, testimony from defendant’s former girlfriend focused on his gang connections and his motivations for the killing, including following orders from gang leaders so that he could move up in the organization. At the charge conference, the trial court denied the State’s request for an instruction on acting in concert, but the prosecutor made arguments related to acting in concert anyway. When defense counsel gave closing arguments, he referenced the structure of the gang and conceded that defendant was present at the scene of the crime and that he ran away afterwards, leaving his shoes outside the house. Defendant was subsequently convicted.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant’s argument that “his counsel impliedly admitted defendant’s guilt when he stated during closing arguments that defendant went to the home of the victim with [two gang members] on the night of the incident.” Slip Op. at 10. The court explained this represented a violation of defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment as articulated in <em>State v. Harbison</em>, 315 N.C. 175 (1985). Here, there was no on-the-record <em>Harbison </em>inquiry except for defendant’s consent to the discussion of a prior conviction. There was “no evidence in the record to suggest that at any other point before or during trial defendant’s counsel sought or obtained informed consent from defendant to discuss his presence at the crime scene or his involvement with the gang the evening of the incident.” Slip Op. at 12. The court also highlighted defense counsel’s statements that represented “an implied admission that although defendant was following orders, he was also a participant in the crime in question.” <em>Id</em>. at 15-16. Defense counsel’s <em>Harbison </em>error of impliedly admitting defendant’s guilt justified a new trial.</p>
<p>Judge Stading dissented, arguing defense counsel did not impliedly admit defendant’s guilt, and that even if he did admit guilt, the lack of record about defendant’s voluntary consent justified dismissing the appeal and allowing defendant to file a motion for appropriate relief.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The post <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/case-summaries-n-c-court-of-appeals-may-7-2025/">Case Summaries: N.C. Court of Appeals (May 7, 2025)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu">North Carolina Criminal Law</a>.</p>
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		<title>Case Summaries: N.C. Court of Appeals (April 16, 2025)</title>
		<link>https://www.disabilityandrepresentation.com/personal-injury-lawyer/case-summaries-n-c-court-of-appeals-april-16-2025/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Phipps]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 Apr 2025 13:34:34 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[North Carolina]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Personal Injury Lawyer]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.disabilityandrepresentation.com/?p=72963</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on April 16, 2025. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present. Circumstances surrounding arrest and discovery of pipe supported conclusion that defendant intended to [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on April 16, 2025. These summaries will be added to <a href="https://www.sog.unc.edu/sccc/">Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium</a>, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.<span id="more-19792"></span></p>
<p><strong>Circumstances surrounding arrest and discovery of pipe supported conclusion that defendant intended to use the pipe for controlled substances other than marijuana. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44308">State v. Bryant</a>, COA24-436, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Apr. 16, 2025). In this Union County case, defendant appealed his conviction for misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, arguing insufficient evidence that he intended to use the paraphernalia, a pipe, for a controlled substance other than marijuana. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding no error.</p>
<p>Defendant was arrested after an encounter in September 2021 where police officers thought defendant and his two acquaintances were shoplifting from a local Belk. The officers did not find any store merchandise, but while searching one of the acquaintances, the officers found a medicine bottle with small baggies filled with a brown powder. Defendant ran from the officers, throwing a bottle that also contained the brown powdery substance. When defendant was detained, officers found a glass pipe, red straw, and plastic baggies containing power on his person. The brown substance was confirmed to be heroin after testing. Defendant came to trial on charges of felony trafficking in heroin by possession and transporting, as well as the misdemeanor charge. Defendant moved to dismiss the misdemeanor, but the trial court denied the motion, and defendant was subsequently convicted.</p>
<p>On appeal, defendant pointed to G.S. 90-113.22, which makes it a misdemeanor offense to “knowingly use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to . . . inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce into the body a controlled substance <em>other than marijuana</em> which it would be unlawful to possess.” Slip Op. at 5. Defendant argued insufficient evidence to show he intended to use the pipe for a controlled substance other than marijuana. The Court of Appeals noted a lack of controlling authority, but looked to <em>State v. Gamble</em>, 218 N.C. App. 456, 2012 WL 380251 (2012) (unpublished), and <em>State v. Harlee</em>, 180 N.C. App. 692, 2006 WL 3718084 (2006) (unpublished), for guidance regarding circumstances that supported intent with paraphernalia like crack pipes. The court found similar support here, as the pipe was found in the same pocket of defendant’s pants as the baggies of heroin, and the pipe was visibly charred, showing previous use.</p>
<p><strong>Trial court’s finding that defendant consented to the search of her vehicle did not clearly extend to search of her wallet outside the vehicle, justifying remand. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44176">State v. Peters</a>, COA24-475, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Apr. 16, 2025). In this McDowell County case, defendant appealed after pleading guilty to possession of methamphetamine, arguing error in denying her motion to suppress the evidence found during a warrantless search. The Court of Appeals agreed, vacating and remanding for consideration of whether defendant clearly and unequivocally consented to the search of her wallet.</p>
<p>In July of 2022, defendant and a man were living in a camp near Pisgah National Forest when they were approached by Wildlife Resource Commission officers. The officers asked for proof that defendant owned the vehicle in the camp, and she provided proof of title. The officers then asked if they could check out the car, to which the man residing with defendant said yes; this man had been the driver of the vehicle as defendant did not have a valid license. Due to circumstances unknown, defendant’s wallet ended up on the roof of the vehicle and the officers searched her wallet while looking through the vehicle, finding a bag of methamphetamine. Nothing legally significant was found inside the vehicle, and defendant came to trial on a charge of possession based on the methamphetamine found in her wallet. At trial, defendant moved to suppress, arguing that the search of her wallet was unconstitutional, but the trial court denied the motion. Defendant pleaded guilty, reserving her right to appeal the issue.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeals first established that defendant impliedly consented to the search of her vehicle, based on her failure to object to the search when a third party gave consent, and her actions attempting to facilitate the search by cleaning an area of the vehicle. However, the court noted the distinction between consent to search the inside of the vehicle and consent to search defendant’s wallet, as “[t]he wallet was neither inside nor otherwise attached to the vehicle.” Slip Op. at 6. Because the trial court did not make a determination as to whether defendant consented to the search of her wallet, “the trial court’s findings cannot support its order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.” <em>Id</em>. at 7. The court then reasoned through the appropriate remedy, concluding that the trial court must determine based on the evidence whether the officer objectively believed that defendant placing her wallet on the roof represented “giving her clear and unequivocal consent to the officer’s search of her wallet.” <em>Id</em>. at 9.</p>
<p><strong>Trial court was not required to hold a hearing or make findings of fact when considering the record and making a recommendation on life without parole sentence under G.S. 15A-1380.5. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44261">State v. Walker</a>, COA 24-615, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Apr. 16, 2025). In this Wake County case, defendant appealed the order determining that his sentence of life without parole should not be altered under G.S. 15A-1380.5. The Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion or error and affirmed the trial court’s order.</p>
<p>Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder in 1999 and received the sentence of life without the possibility of parole. In September of 2023, defendant requested review of his sentence under G.S. 15A-1380.5. After the trial court reviewed the trial record, defendant’s record from the Department of Corrections, the degree of risk posed to society, and other issues, the trial court determined defendant’s sentence should not be altered. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari to appeal this decision, and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari in April 2024.</p>
<p>Defendant argued three issues on appeal: (1) abuse of discretion in failing to make findings of fact to support the denial, (2) error in failing to consider the trial record, and (3) abuse of discretion by not holding a hearing. The Court of Appeals looked to the text of G.S. 15A-1380.5 and caselaw interpreting it to determine the applicable requirements. The court first dispensed with the hearing issue (3), explaining “[o]ur Supreme Court has held that [G.S.] 15A-1380.5 ‘guarantees no hearing, no notice, and no procedural rights.’” Slip Op. at 5 (quoting <em>State v. Young</em>, 369 N.C. 118, 124 (2016)). Next the court moved to (1), noting the structure of G.S. 15A-1380.5 did not call for an “order” with findings of fact and conclusions of law, but instead called for a “recommendation,” and “[h]ad the legislature intended for findings of fact and conclusions of law to be required it could have chosen to require the reviewing judge to issue orders, rather than recommendations.” <em>Id</em>. at 6. Finally, the court noted in (2) that the trial court clearly stated it had considered the record, and the court determined the record supported the trial court’s conclusion.</p>
<p><strong>Assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury may serve as the predicate for felony murder when defendant acted with actual intent to commit the act forming the basis of the murder charge; G.S. 20-166 is ambiguous regarding the unit of prosecution, leading the court to apply the rule of lenity and conclude the unit is per crash, not per victim. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44034">State v. Watlington</a>, COA23-1106, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Apr. 16, 2025). In this Guilford County case, two defendants, Watlington and Felton, both appealed from judgments entered after a trial where the defendants were tried jointly. Watlington was convicted of first-degree murder and additional felonies related to her attempts to run over multiple people at a gas station after a fight. Felton was convicted of eleven counts of accessory after the fact to Watlington’s convictions. The Court of Appeals arrested judgment on three of Watlington’s convictions for hit and run and three of Felton’s convictions for accessory after the fact to hit and run, but found no error with the other convictions, remanding for resentencing.</p>
<p>One early morning in October of 2019, Felton drove an SUV to a gas station in Greensboro, with Watlington as a passenger. After hitting a parked car, a confrontation ensued between Watlington, Felton, and the car’s owner. The argument escalated into a brawl involving multiple people over the course of twenty-five minutes, and testimony showed Felton was the primary aggressor. Around thirty minutes after the confrontation began, Watlington got into the driver’s seat of the SUV and backed over a group of people; it took her approximately ten seconds to completely run over the victims. After stopping completely clear of the victims and sitting for eight seconds, Watlington drove forward, running over the same group of people at full speed. Felton watched the entire incident without stopping Watlington, then stood over the victims yelling at them. One victim died at the scene, and several others sustained serious injuries. The two defendants drove away in the SUV but were apprehended nearby a short time later.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeals took up Watlington’s arguments first, beginning with her argument that it was error for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury to be the predicate felony for her first-degree murder conviction. In <em>State v. Jones</em>, 353 N.C. 159 (1994), the Supreme Court held that “[f]or assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury to serve as the predicate felony for a felony murder conviction . . . the individual must have acted with a ‘level of intent greater than culpable negligence.’” Slip Op. at 11 (quoting <em>Jones</em> at 167). Here, Watlington argued that <em>Jones</em> represented a “bright-line rule” that assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury could never be a predicate felony, an argument the court rejected. <em>Id</em>. Instead, the court explained that “assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, as a matter of law, can serve as the predicate felony for a felony murder conviction when the defendant acts with the ‘actual intent to commit the act that forms the basis of [the] first-degree murder charge.’”<em> Id</em>. at 13 (quoting <em>Jones</em> at 166). The trial court properly instructed the jury in this case, and the court noted that sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that Watlington acted intentionally when driving over the victims with the SUV. The court also rejected Watlington’s challenge to the jury instruction for felony murder and the lack of an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, finding no errors in the instruction given and no evidence to support an additional voluntary manslaughter instruction.</p>
<p>The court next considered Watlington’s argument regarding her multiple hit and run counts, and agreed that the structure of the statute did not support all the convictions. G.S. 20-166 “does not clarify whether its unit of prosecution is the conduct of leaving the scene of a crash or the number of victims injured as a result of the crash,” resulting in an ambiguity for the court to resolve. <em>Id</em>. at 18. Here the court applied the rule of lenity, interpreting the ambiguity in Watlington’s favor. The court explained that there were five victims, but only two crashes, one when Watlington backed over the victims and the second when Watlington drove forward over the victims. As a result, Watlington could only be convicted twice, “one conviction for Watlington’s conduct of leaving the scene of each crash,” and the court arrested judgment on the other three hit and run convictions. <em>Id</em>. at 21.</p>
<p>Arriving at Felton’s arguments, the court first dispensed with her argument that there was insufficient evidence to support her convictions for accessory after the fact. Here, evidence showed that Felton watched Watlington hit the victims with the SUV, then left the scene with her and took the keys to the SUV, concealing the identity of Watlington as the driver. The court found this evidence sufficient to support Felton’s convictions. The court also rejected Felton’s challenge to the language of her indictments, finding no fatal variance from the evidence at trial.</p>
<p>Felton argued that she should not be subject to multiple convictions for accessory after the fact; the court rejected this, explaining “the context of [G.S.] 14-7 clearly indicates that the legislature intended the allowable unit of prosecution to be each felony for which the principal committed and the accessory assisted after the fact.” <em>Id</em>. at 27. The court then considered Felton’s argument that she was convicted as accessory after the fact to hit and run for merely leaving the scene. Rejecting this argument, the court pointed to the many other aspects of Felton’s culpability after the crashes, including taking the SUV’s keys and concealing Watlington’s identity as the driver. However, the court arrested judgment on three of Felton’s convictions, as it had done for Watlington’s hit and run convictions discussed above.</p>
<p>Felton then challenged the jury instructions, arguing they provided a theory of guilt not alleged in the indictments, specifically that she assisted Watlington in attempting to escape. The court noted the circumstantial evidence of Felton possessing the SUV keys and that this did not represent a stand-alone theory of guilt, rejecting Felton’s argument. Finally, the court rejected Felton’s challenge to the closing argument, noting that law enforcement body cam footage supported the inference that Felton and Watlington were together when apprehended.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The post <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/case-summaries-n-c-court-of-appeals-april-16-2025/">Case Summaries: N.C. Court of Appeals (April 16, 2025)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu">North Carolina Criminal Law</a>.</p>
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		<title>Case Summaries: N.C. Court of Appeals (April 2, 2025)</title>
		<link>https://www.disabilityandrepresentation.com/nc-legal-news/case-summaries-n-c-court-of-appeals-april-2-2025/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Phipps]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 07 Apr 2025 12:32:28 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[North Carolina]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.disabilityandrepresentation.com/?p=68798</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on April 2, 2025. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present. Defense counsel’s leading question did not represent offer of proof to preserve excluded-testimony [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on April 2, 2025. These summaries will be added to <a href="https://www.sog.unc.edu/sccc/">Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium</a>, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.<span id="more-19750"></span></p>
<p><strong>Defense counsel’s leading question did not represent offer of proof to preserve excluded-testimony argument for appeal; State’s evidence showed defendant constructively possessed stolen camper. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44250">State v. Capps</a>, COA24-653, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Apr. 2, 2025). In this McDowell County case, defendant appealed his conviction for felonious possession of stolen goods, arguing error in excluding certain cross-examination testimony as hearsay and denying his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. The Court of Appeals found no error.</p>
<p>In November of 2021, a woman called police to report her pop-up camper was missing from her driveway. In December, officers who responded to a fire on defendant’s property discovered the stolen camper in a field near a makeshift campground. Although the camper had been spray-painted a different color and modified to serve as a residence, the officers identified it as the stolen camper by the model and serial number. After a series of interviews, officers came to believe that one or more of the men residing on defendant’s land obtained the camper on his behalf. Defendant came to trial in September 2023 and moved to dismiss the charges, arguing insufficient evidence that he knowingly possessed the stolen camper. The trial court denied the motion. When defense counsel was cross-examining one of the detectives, he asked the detective if defendant told him one of the men on the property lied to defendant. The prosecutor objected on hearsay grounds and the trial court sustained the objection; defense counsel did not make an offer of proof.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeals took up defendant’s hearsay argument first. Because defendant did not make an offer of proof, the matter would normally not be preserved for appeal. However, defendant argued that the offer of proof was in the leading question itself, pointing to a nonprecedential opinion in support, <em>State v. Everett</em>, 178 N.C. App. 44 (2006), <em>aff’d and ordered not precedential</em>, 361 N.C. 217 (2007). The court rejected defendant’s argument, explaining that he “fail[ed] to show the essential content or substance of [the detective’s] excluded testimony; all that appears in the record is defense counsel’s unanswered leading question.” Slip Op. at 6. Since there was no substance of the detective’s potential answer in the record, there was no basis to support appellate review.</p>
<p>Moving to the motion to dismiss, the court noted that the State offered evidence to show defendant’s constructive possession of the camper because he was not the one who purchased or moved the camper to the property directly. The record contained evidence that defendant knew the camper was stolen by the time he was interviewed, along with testimony that defendant didn’t know where the camper came from and didn’t want to ask. These represented “incriminating circumstances” to support the State’s argument for constructive possession and justified denying defendant’s motion to dismiss. <em>Id</em>. at 11.</p>
<p><strong>(1) State’s evidence supported premeditation and deliberation; (2) trial court properly allowed previous testimony regarding defendant’s violence towards his girlfriend; (3) State’s closing argument misstatement of law was cured by jury instruction; (4) excluding evidence of victim’s gang affiliation was not error. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44324">State v. Ervin</a>, COA24-650, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Apr. 2, 2025). In this Durham County case, defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing error in (1) denying his motion to dismiss, (2) admitting testimony of several of his prior violent acts, (3) overruling his objection to the State’s closing argument, and (4) excluding evidence surrounding the victim’s alleged gang involvement. The Court of Appeals found no error.</p>
<p>In March of 2019, defendant lived in a townhouse with his girlfriend, as well as his girlfriend’s brother, the brother’s girlfriend, and defendant’s sister. Conflict developed between defendant and his girlfriend/her brother after they learned another woman was pregnant with defendant’s child. On the day of the murder, defendant argued with his girlfriend after her mother recommended defendant move out of the townhouse. Later that evening, a confrontation led to defendant shooting the brother at the back door of the townhouse. Defendant surrendered to law enforcement and told officers he shot in self-defense. Despite the self-defense argument, the jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder.</p>
<p>In (1), defendant argued insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation, an argument the Court of Appeals rejected. The court noted that although defendant and the victim engaged in a fight before the shooting, defendant “walked away from this fight on his own accord” and then he “walked up two flights of stairs, retrieved his gun, walked down to the second floor, talked with his sister for a period of time, and then walked back down to the first floor.” Slip Op. at 7. This showed defendant clearly anticipated another confrontation and planned to respond. The court also pointed to multiple shots from defendant, as “[r]egardless of Defendant’s intent when he fired his first shot, there was adequate time between each shot for Defendant to think through his actions.” <em>Id</em>. at 8. Additionally, the State’s evidence suggested defendant did not act in self-defense, supporting the conviction.</p>
<p>For (2), defendant’s argument referenced testimony from his girlfriend about three previous incidents where he was violent towards her. The court first looked to Rules of Evidence 401 and 402, determining that the testimony was relevant as it provided context to the “circumstances surrounding the parties” and defendant’s relationship with his girlfriend and her brother before the shooting. <em>Id</em>. at 10. Moving to Rule 404(b), the court explained that the evidence showed defendant’s “motive and intent” and was “also sufficiently similar and temporally proximate to the charged crime.” <em>Id</em>. at 13. Finally, the court arrived at Rule 403, determining that “[a]fter considering the arguments made by both parties, the trial court conducted the proper balancing test required under Rule 403 to determine the evidence’s admissibility.” <em>Id</em>. at 16.</p>
<p>Reaching (3), defendant argued that during closing argument a prosecutor misstated the law of self-defense, arguing it did not apply because defendant shot an unarmed man. Defendant objected to the statement, but the trial court overruled the objection. The court quoted the confusing statement: “[e]ven if it is reasonable, the defendant never has a right to use excessive force.” <em>Id</em>. at 17. Despite this confusing statement, the State further argued that defendant’s use of force was unreasonable and the jury instruction was proper, leading the court to conclude any improper statement of law was cured by the correct instructions.</p>
<p>Finally, in (4), defendant argued that denying his attempts to introduce evidence of the victim’s gang affiliation was error. The court disagreed, concluding that even if relevant, the evidence’s “probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice” and did little to support defendant’s claim of self-defense. <em>Id</em>. at 20.</p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/case-summaries-n-c-court-of-appeals-april-2-2025/">Case Summaries: N.C. Court of Appeals (April 2, 2025)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu">North Carolina Criminal Law</a>.</p>
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		<title>Case Summaries: N.C. Supreme Court (Mar. 21, 2025)</title>
		<link>https://www.disabilityandrepresentation.com/nc-legal-news/case-summaries-n-c-supreme-court-mar-21-2025/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Phipps]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Mar 2025 14:58:18 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[North Carolina]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the Supreme Court of North Carolina released on March 21, 2025. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present. Court affirms case holding hydrocodone represented opiate for controlled substance conviction.  State v. [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the Supreme Court of North Carolina released on March 21, 2025. These summaries will be added to <a href="https://www.sog.unc.edu/sccc/">Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium</a>, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.<span id="more-19701"></span></p>
<p><strong>Court affirms case holding hydrocodone represented opiate for controlled substance conviction. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=1&amp;pdf=44643">State v. Miller</a>, 81A24, ___ N.C. ___ (Mar. 21, 2025). In this Henderson County case, the Supreme Court affirmed per curiam the Court of Appeals decision <a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=42433"><em>State v. Miller</em></a>, 292 N.C. App. 519 (2024), where the majority held that hydrocodone, an opioid, qualified as an “opiate” for purposes of G.S. 90-95(h)(4) at the time of the offense, supporting defendant’s conviction.</p>
<p><strong>Defendant’s life without parole sentences complied with <em>Miller v. Alabama</em>.</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=1&amp;pdf=44641">State v. Borlase</a>, 33A24, ___ N.C. ___ (Mar. 21, 2025). In this Watauga County case, the Supreme Court majority affirmed the Court of Appeals decision finding no error with the imposition of two consecutive life sentences without parole for defendant’s first-degree murder convictions.</p>
<p>In April of 2019, when defendant was a senior in high school and seventeen years old, he stabbed his mother and father to death with a large kitchen knife. Defendant then took steps to cover up the murder, washing away the blood inside their home and hiding the bodies under bags of mulch and leaves from the yard, and went to smoke marijuana with his friends. After defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, the sentencing court performed the analysis required by G.S. 15A-1340.19B and -1340.19C, and sentenced defendant to two consecutive sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeals majority found no error, but defendant appealed based on the dissent, leading to the current opinion.</p>
<p>Taking up defendant’s appeal, the Supreme Court first explained the body of law around sentencing juveniles to life sentences without parole, including <em>Miller v. Alabama</em>, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and North Carolina’s statutes implementing <em>Miller</em>’s process requirements in G.S. 15A-1340.19A to -1340.19D. Defendant argued that the Court of Appeals did not conduct a thorough appellate review of the sentencing court’s order, a proposition the Court rejected, noting “the majority below determined that the sentencing court’s written order showed that it exercised discretion consistent with the Eighth Amendment in sentencing defendant.” Slip Op. at17. The Court also rejected defendant’s argument that the Court of Appeals failed to apply the abuse of discretion standard, as the majority opinion concluded the sentencing court’s decision “was not arbitrary” <em>Id</em>. at 20. Finally, the Court rejected defendant’s challenges to the sentencing court’s consideration and weighting of evidence, as “the sentencing court considered defendant’s mitigating evidence and made explicit findings in its written order.” <em>Id</em>. at 22. The Court explained “[i]n the absence of express evidence that demonstrates a sentencing court did not consider mitigating evidence or exercise its discretion, we will not presume error.”<em> Id</em>. Here, defendant did not demonstrate the sentencing court refused to consider mitigating evidence, but instead challenged the weight and conclusions it reached, arguments the Court held had no merit.</p>
<p>Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, dissented and would have reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. <em>Id</em>. at 27.</p>
<p><strong>Court affirms decision limiting cross-examination on <em>Sell</em> hearing. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=1&amp;pdf=44640">State v. Gregory</a>, 23A24, ___ N.C. ___ (Mar. 21, 2025). In this Wake County case, the Supreme Court affirmed per curiam the Court of Appeals decision <a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=42890"><em>State v. Gregory</em></a>, 291 N.C. App. 617 (2023), where the majority held that limitation on cross-examination for the State’s expert in forensic psychiatry about the purpose of her testimony at a hearing held under <em>Sell v. United States</em>, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), i.e., to involuntarily medicate defendant so that he would be competent to stand trial, was not error.</p>
<p>Justice Riggs, joined by Justice Earls, dissented and would have held that the limitation of cross-examination regarding the purpose of the expert’s testimony at the <em>Sell</em> hearing represented a violation of defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights.</p>
<p><strong>Court affirms decision finding no error with waiver of counsel after trial court miscalculated range of punishment.</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=1&amp;pdf=44638">State v. Macon</a>, 10PA24, ___ N.C. ___ (Mar. 21, 2025). In this Randolph County case, the Supreme Court modified and affirmed per curiam the unpublished Court of Appeals decision <a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=42846"><em>State v. Macon</em></a>, COA23-357, finding no error with defendant’s convictions for sexual exploitation of a minor after he waived counsel and represented himself at trial. The Court modified and affirmed based on the decision in <a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=1&amp;pdf=44637">S<em>tate v. Fenner</em></a>, 289PA23, issued contemporaneously with this opinion.</p>
<p><strong>Although the trial court misstated the possible range of punishment to defendant when advising him before proceeding pro se, the trial court informed defendant that he effectively faced a life sentence, satisfying the statutory requirement. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=1&amp;pdf=44637">State v. Fenner</a>, 289PA23, ___ N.C. ___ (Mar. 21, 2025). In this Wake County case, the Supreme Court affirmed and modified the unpublished Court of Appeals decision finding no error with defendant’s sentence despite the trial court’s failure to accurately advise him of the full sentencing range he faced if he were convicted.</p>
<p>Before going on trial for various felonies in 2022, defendant told the trial court he wished to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se, and the trial court followed G.S. 15A-1242 by providing defendant with the required colloquy, including the range of permissible punishments he faced. Unfortunately, the trial court miscalculated, informing defendant he faced “75 to 175 years in prison” when he was actually sentenced after his conviction to “121 to 178 years in prison.” Slip Op. at 2. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument that this was error, explaining that he understood he was subject to a life sentence. Defendant petitioned for discretionary review, arguing the Court of Appeals’ precedent on this issue conflicted with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of G.S. 15A-1242, leading to the current case.</p>
<p>The Supreme Court explained the issue as the practical consideration of how long a defendant could be imprisoned, as “the ‘range of permissible punishments’ described in [G.S.] 15A-1242 contains a ceiling equivalent to the defendant’s natural life.” <em>Id</em>. at 8. Here the trial court made a miscalculation, but if “the miscalculation and the actual range are tantamount to the remainder of the defendant’s life, the trial court complies with the statute.” <em>Id</em>. Put more simply, defendant was informed “if convicted, he could spend the rest of his life in prison,” and “[t]hat accurately conveyed the sentencing range that [defendant] faced in this case and therefore confirmed that [defendant] comprehended the range of permissible punishments.” <em>Id</em>. at 9.</p>
<p>The Court dispensed with defendant’s other issues with the Court of Appeals decision, but modified the decision to the extent that it did not call for the trial court to advise defendant of all the charges against him. Although the Court did not interpret the Court of Appeals decision to say this, the Court provided the following guidance to trial courts:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When calculating the permissible range of punishments, the best practice is for trial courts to use the checklist of inquiries we articulated in <em>State v. Moore</em>, 362 N.C. 319, 327–28 (2008). This includes informing the defendant of all charges in the case and the minimum and maximum possible sentence the defendant faces if convicted of all those charges.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><em>Id</em>. at 11.</p>
<p><strong>Defendant’s life without parole sentence satisfied <em>Miller v. Alabama </em>requirements and his jury selection claim was barred by statute. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=1&amp;pdf=44634">State v. Sims</a>, 297PA18, ___ N.C. ___ (Mar. 21, 2025). In this Onslow County case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision finding no error in defendant’s sentence of life without parole for first-degree murder. Defendant’s co-defendant for this murder also appealed, and the Supreme Court considered that appeal in <a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=1&amp;pdf=44633"><em>State v. Bell</em></a>, 86A02-2, issued contemporaneously with this opinion.</p>
<p>In January of 2000, defendant and a co-defendant kidnapped and killed an eighty-nine-year-old woman. In 2001 defendant was tried for murder, and although the State sought the death penalty, defendant was sentenced to life without parole. The Supreme Court upheld this conviction on defendant’s initial appeal. Subsequently, defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), arguing his mandatory life without parole sentence was unconstitutional under <em>Miller v. Alabama</em>, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and a superior court concluded his sentence was valid in a hearing held in 2014. Defendant then appealed; however, before the Supreme Court could take up the appeal, defendant filed a second MAR arguing gender discrimination in jury selection under <em>J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.</em>, 511 U.S. 127 (1994). The superior court considering this second MAR found a violation of <em>J.E.B.</em>, and both MARs form the basis of the current opinion.</p>
<p>Taking up the <em>J.E.B.</em> claim first, the Supreme Court explained G.S. 15A-1419 operates as a bar to post-conviction review of certain issues like defendant’s <em>J.E.B.</em> claim, unless the defendant can demonstrate good cause under G.S. 15A-1419(c) or a fundamental miscarriage of justice under G.S. 15A-1419(e). For the reasons stated in <a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=1&amp;pdf=44633"><em>State v. Bell</em></a><em>, </em>the Court held that defendant’s claim was barred under G.S. 15A-1419.</p>
<p>The Court then moved to the life without parole sentence, explaining defendant challenged the sentence on two fronts, that the sentence violated his Eighth Amendment rights and that the sentencing court disregarded mitigating evidence and failed to properly weigh the evidence. The Court disagreed with both of defendant’s assertions, highlighting that the procedure in G.S. 15A-1340.19, the <em>Miller</em>-fix statute, conforms to federal law.</p>
<p>The Court first clarified that “the inquiry is not whether a defendant is permanently incorrigible or irreparably corrupt; nor is it potential for redemption[,]” meaning that the only requirement was that the superior court comply with the <em>Miller</em>-fix statute when conducting its inquiry. Slip Op. at 18. After establishing this framework, the Court walked through defendant’s specific challenges to the various conclusions of the superior court, finding no abuse of discretion. The Court concluded by dismissing defendant’s argument that the Court of Appeals applied an improper standard of review, and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision.</p>
<p>Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, concurred in the result only, and wrote to highlight issues with the majority’s analysis. <em>Id</em>. at 36.</p>
<p><strong>Defendant’s claim of gender-based discrimination in jury selection was barred, as claim could have been brought on direct appeal. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=1&amp;pdf=44633">State v. Bell</a>, 86A02-2, (Mar. 21, 2025). In this Onslow County case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review defendant’s post-conviction motion for appropriate relief (MAR), and an amendment to the MAR, after receiving a sentence of death for first-degree murder. The Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment denying defendant’s MAR, concluding that defendant’s claim of gender-based discrimination in jury selection was not preserved for review and barred by G.S. 15A-1419. Defendant’s co-defendant for this murder also appealed, and the Supreme Court considered that appeal in <a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=1&amp;pdf=44634"><em>State v. Sims</em></a>, 297PA18, issued contemporaneously with this opinion.</p>
<p>In January of 2000, defendant and a co-defendant kidnapped and killed an eighty-nine-year-old woman. In 2001 defendant was tried for murder, receiving the death penalty. The Supreme Court upheld this conviction on defendant’s appeal. Subsequently defendant filed his initial MAR, which he then amended in 2012 by arguing unconstitutional gender-based discrimination at his trial based on the affidavit of one of the State’s prosecutors at defendant’s trial. This affidavit referenced a specific female juror who was struck on the basis of her gender, as the prosecution was attempting to get more male jurors on the panel. The superior court determined that defendant was in a position to raise the gender-based discrimination claim on direct appeal and his MAR claim was barred. After this, an evidentiary hearing was held in 2022, and the superior court reviewing the MAR of defendant and his co-defendant found gender-based discrimination under <em>J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.</em>, 511 U.S. 127 (1994). The procedural history and findings of the superior court are detailed in pages 6-14 of the slip opinion.</p>
<p>Taking up defendant’s petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court first reviewed whether defendant had preserved his claim “that the prosecutor impermissibly struck a juror on the basis of gender.” Slip Op. at 16. The Court concluded defendant failed to preserve his claim, as constitutional issues not raised on direct appeal are waived, and even if defendant preserved his <em>J.E.B.</em> claim, it was procedurally barred under G.S. 15A-1419. Defendant argued that he was not able to raise his discrimination claim on direct appeal because he was not yet in possession of the prosecutor’s affidavit, meaning he did not have sufficient evidence to adequately raise the claim at that time. The Court rejected this argument, as “[t]he jury selection transcript reveals pointed statements baldly communicated by the State—in open court—that it wanted to place more men on the jury at the expense of seating women.” <em>Id</em>. at 20. Additionally, the Court noted “the transcripts and questionnaires provide the basis for a statistical analysis of the State’s use of peremptory strikes based on gender.” <em>Id</em>. at 22. Essentially, the Court held that the evidence of discrimination was obvious from the proceedings and defendant could have performed the statistical analysis supporting the discrimination claim without the prosecutor’s affidavit; defendant’s own statistical expert performed the analysis during the MAR evidentiary hearing with this information.</p>
<p>The Court also rejected defendant’s argument that the later discovery of the prosecutor’s affidavit represented good cause under G.S. 15A-1419(c) to overcome the mandatory procedural bar. As noted above, the Court did not agree that the prosecutor’s affidavit was essential to raising the claim, as “[i]t is evident from the cold record that the remarks made by the State during voir dire put defendant on notice that he needed to raise a <em>J.E.B.</em> objection.” <em>Id</em>. at 27. While acknowledging that the discriminatory behavior in this matter was reprehensible, the Court held that statutory and procedural requirements barred consideration of defendant’s claim as he did not raise it on direct appeal.</p>
<p>Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, concurred in the result only, writing separately to note that precedent constrained the possible methods of post-conviction relief in situations like the current case.<em> Id</em>. at 31.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The post <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/case-summaries-n-c-supreme-court-mar-21-2025/">Case Summaries: N.C. Supreme Court (Mar. 21, 2025)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu">North Carolina Criminal Law</a>.</p>
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		<title>Case Summaries: N.C. Court of Appeals (March 19, 2025)</title>
		<link>https://www.disabilityandrepresentation.com/personal-injury-lawyer/case-summaries-n-c-court-of-appeals-march-19-2025/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Phipps]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 24 Mar 2025 14:23:46 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[North Carolina]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Personal Injury Lawyer]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on March 19, 2025. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present. State’s questions regarding defendant’s failure to give a statement did not represent plain [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on March 19, 2025. These summaries will be added to <a href="https://www.sog.unc.edu/sccc/">Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium</a>, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.<span id="more-19687"></span></p>
<p><strong>State’s questions regarding defendant’s failure to give a statement did not represent plain error; closing argument reference to defendant’s self-defense claim as “smoke and mirrors” was not grossly improper. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44196">State v. Earley,</a> COA24-386, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 19, 2025). In this Union County case, defendant appealed her convictions for attempted first-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, arguing error in (1) allowing the State to repeatedly question defendant about her failure to make a statement to law enforcement, and (2) allowing the State to reference her silence during closing argument. The Court of Appeals majority found no plain error.</p>
<p>The charges against defendant arose from her shooting her husband in the bathroom of their home in January 2022. Defendant fled the home but later turned herself in, declining to give a statement but telling officers she had no injuries. At trial, a prosecutor asked one of the law enforcement officers if defendant was given a chance to make a statement, and defense counsel objected. The objection was overruled, and the officer confirmed he did give defendant a chance to make a statement. Later questioning covered the officer’s attempts to speak to defendant on the phone about her version of events, which defense counsel did not object to at the time. Defendant was cross-examined about not giving a statement, and defense counsel again failed to timely object. Defendant’s version of events presented a self-defense claim, which the prosecutor called “smoke and mirrors” during closing argument. Defense counsel objected to this statement after the jury had left for deliberations, but the trial court did not rule on the objection, and defendant was subsequently convicted.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeals first established that defendant did not properly preserve her arguments for appeal, meaning the review would be plain error for (1) and grossly improper for (2). Taking up (1), the court disagreed that the questioning rose to the level of plain error, as “[t]he State presented overwhelming evidence from which a jury could conclude that the State’s version, rather than Defendant’s version, accurately explained the events.” Slip Op. at 20. This included defendant’s lack of injuries and the crime scene evidence of the blood, broken glass, and location of bullets in the walls, which did not support defendant’s narrative of a struggle and firing in self-defense. Moving to (2), the court disagreed that the prosecutor’s statements were grossly improper, as “the State’s references to Defendant’s silence were <em>de minimis</em> and, in context of the Record, do not rise to the level of being prejudicial to Defendant.” <em>Id</em>. at 25.</p>
<p>Judge Tyson provided a lengthy dissent, arguing “[t]he State repeatedly violated Defendant’s assertion of [her] rights and belittled her silence and prejudiced her before the jury.” <em>Id</em>. at 28.</p>
<p><strong>Defendant forfeited right to counsel and right to be present in courtroom by repeated disruptive conduct; Virginia conviction for identity theft was not substantially similar to North Carolina offense for sentencing purposes. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44045">State v. Fuller</a>, COA24-471, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 19, 2025). In this Rockingham County case, defendant appealed his convictions for obstruction of justice, attempting to access a government computer to defraud, and filing false liens, arguing error in (1) concluding defendant forfeited his right to counsel and right to be present in the courtroom for trial, and (2) finding that defendant’s Virginia conviction was substantially similar to the North Carolina offense of identity theft for sentencing. The Court of Appeals found no error in (1), but remanded for resentencing based on (2).</p>
<p>Defendant was indicted in February 2022, and at his first appearance indicated he wanted to waive his right to counsel but refused to sign the waiver form. At a later pretrial appearance, defendant asked for counsel to be appointed for “the defendant,” but gave confusing responses as to whether he was requesting counsel for himself. At the next appearance before the trial court, defendant was removed for being disruptive, and eventually the trial court concluded defendant had forfeited his right to counsel through inappropriate behavior. At trial, defendant was handcuffed to a wheelchair after threatening to remove his clothing. After another confusing exchange where defendant requested a lawyer for “the defendant,” and caused disruption in the courtroom, defendant was removed from the courtroom and was given written updates on the trial by the trial court. Defendant was subsequently convicted on all counts.</p>
<p>Taking up (1), the Court of Appeals looked to <em>State v. Smith</em>, 292 N.C. App. 656 (2024), for the applicable standard when a defendant’s conduct justifies forfeiture of counsel. Here, defendant’s conduct was “combative and interruptive—he insisted the trial court could not be impartial, interrupted and spoke out of turn, threatened to remove his clothing, and refused to directly answer the trial court’s questions.” Slip Op. at 16. As a result, the court held that it was not error to conclude defendant forfeited his right to counsel. The court then considered whether removing defendant from the courtroom was error, looking to <em>United States v. Mack</em>, 362 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2004) and <em>People v. Cohn</em>, 160 P.3d 336 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007). Complicating the considerations, many cases and G.S. 15A-1032 presume that a defendant removed from the courtroom will be represented by counsel, which was not the case here. The court concluded that the trial court’s actions here were reasonable, including providing updates to defendant and instructing the jury not to consider defendant’s removal from the courtroom. Finally, the court concluded that not appointing standby counsel was not prejudicial error and G.S. 15A-1032 did not require appointment of standby counsel when defendant was removed.</p>
<p>Arriving at (2), the court explained that Virginia’s statute on identity theft (Va. Code § 18.2-186.3) differed in material ways from the North Carolina version in G.S. 14-113.22. The court agreed with defendant’s argument that “the statutes are not substantially similar because Virginia’s statute can be violated using the identifying information of a ‘false or fictitious person’ whereas North Carolina’s statute requires the offender to have used the identifying information of a ‘real person.’” Slip Op. at 28. Thus the court remanded for resentencing.</p>
<p><strong>Court of Appeals found no prejudicial error after <em>Anders</em> brief review. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44468">State v. Johnston</a>, COA24-816, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 19, 2025). In this Pitt County case, defendant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and felony fleeing to elude arrest; defense counsel filed a brief under <em>Anders v. California</em>, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The Court of Appeals found no error.</p>
<p>Defendant was arrested for speeding past a highway patrol officer, fleeing from the officer for several miles, and throwing something out of his window. Once defendant was pulled over, a search of the vehicle discovered cocaine and $1,100 in cash. Defendant came to trial in May 2023, where he was acquitted of driving while impaired and maintaining a vehicle for selling cocaine, but convicted of the other charges.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeals took up defendant’s appeal and conducted a review under <em>Anders</em> looking for any prejudicial error. The court considered the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for substitute counsel, whether defendant expressed a desire to represent himself, an overruled objection to testimony, and defendant’s opportunity to address the trial court regarding attorney’s fees, concluding that none of these issues represented error.</p>
<p><strong>Defendant’s disputes and requests for replacement of appointed counsel did not represent forfeiture or waiver of counsel, justifying remand for new trial. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44199">State v. McGirt</a>, COA24-551, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 19, 2025). In this Wake County case, defendant appealed his convictions for statutory sex offense with a child and indecent liberties with a child, arguing error in concluding defendant waived his right to counsel or forfeited his right to counsel. The Court of Appeals majority concluded defendant did not voluntarily waive his right to counsel or forfeit his right to counsel, reversing and remanding for a new trial.</p>
<p>In 2019, defendant was indicted for the sex offense and indecent liberties charges, and because defendant was indigent the trial court appointed counsel. This began a series of five appointed attorneys representing defendant, and by 2023 all the attorneys withdrew or were replaced. On May 4, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the final attorney’s motion to withdraw, and after consulting with defendant concluded that defendant had waived his right to representation and ordered the public defender’s office to supply standby counsel. On May 22, 2023, defendant requested another court-appointed attorney, and the trial court denied the request. The State moved to have standby counsel question witnesses during trial and the trial court granted the motion, but otherwise defendant represented himself at trial.</p>
<p>Taking up defendant’s arguments, the Court of Appeals first considered waiver, looking to precedent like <em>State v. Moore</em>, 290 N.C. App. 610 (2023), for the circumstances required to find waiver of the right to counsel. Here, the trial court did not tell defendant that if he fired his attorney, he would be waiving the right to counsel, instead pronouncing this after granting the attorney’s motion to withdraw. Also, “[t]he trial court never asked if Defendant wished to represent himself, nor did Defendant make an explicit statement that he would represent himself” and the trial court also “did not inquire whether Defendant understood the difference between a court-appointed counsel versus standby counsel, such that Defendant was now proceeding pro se.” Slip Op. at 14 (cleaned up). The court noted that defendant repeatedly asked for new counsel, despite once mentioning representing himself, meaning it was not clear and unequivocal that defendant wished to represent himself. As a result, the court concluded defendant did not “clearly and unequivocally” waive his right to counsel. <em>Id</em>. at 18.</p>
<p>The court then looked to whether defendant forfeited his right to counsel, concluding “[b]ased on the Record evidence, we cannot say Defendant’s firing of his attorneys was ‘egregious misconduct’ or a flagrant delaying tactic” and it was error to find that defendant forfeited his right to counsel. <em>Id</em>. at 23. Finally, the court considered the hybrid waiver/forfeiture by conduct outlined in <em>State v. Blakeney</em>, 245 N.C. App. 452 (2016). The court concluded defendant did not waive his right to counsel by conduct “[b]ecause waiver by conduct ‘requires that a defendant be warned about the consequences of his conduct,’ and there is no Record here that the trial court provided Defendant with any warning regarding his conduct, nor does the State argue there was any warning[.]” <em>Id</em>. at 25 (quoting <em>Blakeney </em>at 465).</p>
<p>Judge Tyson dissented and argued “[t]he majority’s opinion incorrectly concludes Defendant did not waive or forfeit his right to counsel.” <em>Id</em>. at 32.</p>
<p><strong>Defense counsel’s <em>Harbison</em> error justified new trial. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44182">State v. Meadows</a>, COA24-149, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 19, 2025). In this Duplin County case, defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon, arguing defense counsel was ineffective by conceding his guilt without permission. The Court of Appeals majority agreed, vacating the judgment and granting defendant a new trial.</p>
<p>In July of 2016, officers responded to the report of a break-in and gunshot injuries. Defendant was indicted for the break-in and shooting of the victim and came to trial in March 2023. Before and during the trial, defendant attempted to get new counsel three times, but each attempt was denied by the trial court. During trial, testimony from defendant’s former girlfriend focused on his gang connections and his motivations for the killing, including following orders from gang leaders so that he could move up in the organization. At the charge conference, the trial court denied the State’s request for an instruction on acting in concert, but the prosecutor made arguments related to acting in concert anyway. When defense counsel gave closing arguments, he referenced the structure of the gang and conceded that defendant was present at the scene of the crime and that he ran away afterwards, leaving his shoes outside the house. Defendant was subsequently convicted.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant’s argument that “his counsel impliedly admitted defendant’s guilt when he stated during closing arguments that defendant went to the home of the victim with [two gang members] on the night of the incident.” Slip Op. at 10. The court explained this represented a violation of defendant’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as articulated in <em>State v. Harbison</em>, 315 N.C. 175 (1985). Here, there was no on-the-record <em>Harbison </em>inquiry except for defendant’s consent to the discussion of a prior conviction. There was “no evidence in the record to suggest that at any other point before or during trial defendant’s counsel sought or obtained informed consent from defendant to discuss his presence at the crime scene or his involvement with the gang the evening of the incident.” Slip Op. at 12. The court also highlighted defense counsel’s statements that represented “an implied admission that although defendant was following orders, he was also a participant in the crime in question.” <em>Id</em>. at 15-16. Defense counsel’s statements represented a <em>Harbison </em>error of impliedly admitting defendant’s guilt, justifying a new trial.</p>
<p>Judge Stading dissented, arguing defense counsel did not impliedly admit defendant’s guilt, and that even if he did admit guilt, the lack of record about defendant’s voluntary consent justified dismissing the appeal and allowing defendant to file a motion for appropriate relief.</p>
<p><strong>Trial court performed appropriate <em>Waller</em> analysis before closing courtroom during testimony of two witnesses. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=43601">State v. Miller</a>, COA24-72, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 19, 2025). In this Union County case, defendant appealed his convictions for attempted first degree murder, going armed to the terror of the people, and possession of a handgun by a minor, arguing it was error to close the courtroom during the testimony of two witnesses. The Court of Appeals found no error.</p>
<p>This matter arose from a shooting at a basketball court and originally reached the Court of Appeals in <em>State v. Miller</em>, 287 N.C. App. 660, (2023), where the panel concluded that the trial court did not utilize the four-part test from <em>Waller v. Georgia</em>, 467 U.S. 39 (1984), when determining it was acceptable to close the courtroom. On remand, the trial court determined that closing the courtroom during the testimony of two witnesses was justified under <em>Waller</em>, as defendant had attempted to intimidate the young witnesses. The current case comes after the trial court’s entry of an order on remand and defendant’s second appeal.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeals began by laying out the four-part test from <em>Waller</em> and then performed an analysis. The court considered (1) whether the State advanced an overriding interest supporting the closure; (2) whether the trial court made adequate findings to support the closure; (3) if the closure was no broader than necessary; and (4) that no reasonable alternatives to closure existed. First, “the State adequately advanced the overriding interest of witness safety, and that interest was likely to be prejudiced by the intimidation tactics of Defendant and members of the gallery filming.” Slip Op. at 14. The court determined competent evidence supported the closure based on the State’s exhibits and defendant’s prior conduct. The trial court only closed the courtroom during the testimony of the two witnesses, narrowly tailoring the closure to the issue at hand. Finally, the trial court had already banned cellphones in the courtroom, but even then one of defendant’s relatives was found in possession of a cellphone, showing the trial court considered alternatives before moving to closure of the courtroom.</p>
<p><strong>State’s comments regarding not guilty plea and cross-examination of witness did not require trial court to intervene <em>ex mero motu</em>; imposition of Class B1 sentence for defendant’s second-degree murder conviction was proper.</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44385">State v. Parker</a>, COA24-230, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 19, 2025). In this Wilson County case, defendant appealed his convictions for second-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon, arguing error in (1) failing to intervene <em>ex mero motu</em> during the State’s closing argument or in the alternative ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object, and (2) sentencing him to a Class B1 sentence with lack of support. The Court of Appeals found no error.</p>
<p>The murder victim had previously attacked defendant’s son, and defendant came to the house were the victim lived with his mother in May of 2020 seeking retribution. Defendant and an accomplice forced their way into the home and after a confrontation, defendant shot the victim. The accomplice pleaded guilty to manslaughter and testified for the State. During closing arguments, the State referenced defendant’s plea of not guilty, criticized the manner in which defense counsel had cross-examined the victim’s mother, and equated his trial to the charges the accomplice-turned-witness had pled guilty to.</p>
<p>Taking up (1), the Court of Appeals first established that the statements in question occurred after defendant had attacked the validity of the victim’s mother’s testimony in closing arguments, and “[t]he State’s closing arguments were not prejudicial comments on Defendant’s execution of his right to remain silent, but could be considered instead a defense of the State’s strategy.” Slip Op. at 8. When considering the statement regarding the manslaughter plea of the witness, the court explained that while it is possible there was a misstatement of the law, “the trial court also provided the jury with instructions regarding how to evaluate the testimony of a witness who had secured a plea deal from the State.” <em>Id</em>. at 9. Finally, the court found no prejudice from any possible ineffective assistance of counsel, as the State provided overwhelming evidence that defendant was the shooter.</p>
<p>Moving to (2), the court explained that B1 and B2 felonies are “differentiated by the type of malice involved,” with B1 felonies being the default for second-degree murder and B2 felonies being justified by inherently dangerous acts or omissions only. Here, the State did not argue or present evidence defendant acted recklessly or engaged in an inherently dangerous act, and instead “[t]he State presented substantial evidence tending to show Defendant was in unlawful possession of a deadly weapon and was intent on causing harm and revenge.” <em>Id</em>. at 14. Thus, defendant’s sentence was justified by the evidence.</p>
<p><strong>Defendant’s admission that he lived in his parents’ home, along with circumstantial evidence, supported conviction of keeping or maintaining a dwelling for controlled substances. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44257">State v. Rowland</a>, COA24-274, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 19, 2025). In this Wake County case, defendant appealed his convictions including keeping or maintaining a dwelling for the keeping or selling of controlled substances, arguing error in denying his motion to dismiss the keeping or maintaining a dwelling charge. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding no error.</p>
<p>Raleigh Police received information that defendant was selling bundles of heroin from his residence and began investigating, resulting in a 2021 search warrant for the home that turned up heroin, firearms, and drug paraphernalia. The residence was owned by defendant’s parents, and in an interview with police defendant told them he had lived at the residence “on and off since 2005.” Slip Op. at 2. At trial, defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing the State did not demonstrate that the dwelling had been kept or maintained over time for the purpose of controlled substances, but the trial court denied the motion.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeals first noted that G.S. 90-108(a)(7) governed the crime in question, and “[w]hile mere <em>occupancy</em> of a property, without more, will not support the ‘keeping or maintaining’ element, ‘evidence of <em>residency</em>, standing alone, is sufficient to support the element of maintaining.’” <em>Id</em>. at 5 (quoting <em>State v. Spencer</em>, 192 N.C. App. 143, 148 (2008)). Additionally, residency can be established by defendant’s admission and through circumstantial evidence, both of which were present here. The court concluded that the admission defendant resided at his parents’ house along with the State’s circumstantial evidence defendant resided in the home represented substantial evidence defendant kept or maintained a dwelling for controlled substances.</p>
<p><strong>Defendant’s prior record level was improperly calculated due to inclusion of DWLR-Impaired Revocation, and calculation error justified resentencing. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44297">State v. Wilson</a>, COA24-442, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 19, 2025). In this Watauga County case, defendant appealed the sentence he received after pleading guilty to possession of a stolen firearm, arguing error in calculating his prior record level. The Court of Appeals majority agreed, vacating defendant’s sentence and remanding for resentencing.</p>
<p>During sentencing, the trial court calculated defendant’s prior record level as Level III with six points, including one point for defendant’s misdemeanor conviction of driving while license revoked for impaired driving (DWLR-Impaired Revocation). On appeal, defendant argued that the DWLR-Impaired Revocation conviction was exempt from prior record level calculations under G.S. 15A-1340.14(b)(5) as it is an “other misdemeanor traffic offense” identified under the statute. Slip Op. at 2-3. This led the court to conclude that defendant “should have been sentenced as a PRL II, rather than a PRL III.” <em>Id</em>. at 3.</p>
<p>The State argued that this error was not prejudicial, but the court disagreed, noting the holding in <em>State v. Williams</em>, 355 N.C. 501 (2002), that a prior record level error prejudices a defendant even if the sentence given fell within the appropriate presumptive range.</p>
<p>Judge Murry dissented, agreeing that the prior record level calculation was error but that the error was harmless and did not justify remand for resentencing.</p>
<p><strong>Still images from ATM video were properly authenticated and admitted; lay opinion testimony from officer identifying defendant was properly admitted. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44500">State v. Windseth</a>, COA24-718, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 19, 2025). In this Jackson County case, defendant appealed his convictions for felony obtaining property by false pretenses and felony identity fraud, arguing error in (1) admitting ATM videos of defendant that were not properly authenticated, and (2) allowing lay-opinion testimony from an officer identifying defendant in the videos. The Court of Appeals found no error.</p>
<p>When defendant’s mother went missing in January 2022, the sheriff’s office began investigating her disappearance, and they eventually obtained records from Wells Fargo containing videos from ATMs where withdrawals were made from her account. These videos showed defendant making withdrawals, and later when defendant was apprehended, his mother’s credit and debit cards were found on his person. At trial, the State showed stills from these videos, and an officer testified as to the videos and identifying defendant as the person appearing in them. Defense counsel did not object at trial to the admission of these videos or the identification of defendant.</p>
<p>Beginning with (1), the Court of Appeals explained that Rule of Evidence 901 governed admitting the videos, and here defendant only challenged the admission of the still images from these videos. Although this was a novel question, the court rejected the challenge, noting the State laid adequate foundation for the video extractions and “that the trial court properly authenticated the ATM videos as admissible evidence because their derivative photos were ‘nothing more than a series of static images appearing at a given frame rate.’” Slip Op. at 8 (quoting <em>United States v. Clotaire</em>, 963 F.3d 1288 (2020)).</p>
<p>In (2), the court noted that Rule of Evidence 701 governed the lay testimony, and under <em>State v. Collins</em>, 216 N.C. App. 249 (2011), the officer needed some superior level of familiarity with the defendant to justify his testimony identifying the defendant or the testimony would be invading the province of the jury. The court concluded that the evidence here supported the familiarity required by <em>Collins</em>, as the officer “had interacted with Defendant on multiple occasions as part of that preexisting investigation” into his mother’s disappearance. Slip Op. at 10.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The post <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/case-summaries-n-c-court-of-appeals-march-19-2025/">Case Summaries: N.C. Court of Appeals (March 19, 2025)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu">North Carolina Criminal Law</a>.</p>
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		<title>Case Summaries: N.C. Court of Appeals (March 5, 2025)</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Phipps]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 10 Mar 2025 14:21:22 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on March 5, 2025. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present. Second trial judge did not have authority to enter order denying motion to [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on March 5, 2025. These summaries will be added to <a href="https://www.sog.unc.edu/sccc/">Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium</a>, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.<span id="more-19646"></span></p>
<p><strong>Second trial judge did not have authority to enter order denying motion to dismiss when hearing was held and ruling was rendered by previous trial judge who retired before entry of the order. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=43361">State v. Fearns</a>, COA23-650, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 5, 2025). For more in-depth discussion of this case, see <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/state-v-fearns-finds-second-judge-lacked-authority-to-enter-order-when-hearing-was-held-by-first-judge/#more-19640">this post</a> by Prof. Shea Denning. In this Granville County case, defendant appealed her conviction for embezzlement, arguing that the trial court lacked authority to enter the order denying her motion to dismiss because it was not issued by the superior court judge who held the hearing. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s motion and remanded the matter for a new hearing on the motion.</p>
<p>In 2008, police began investigating defendant, an employee of a law firm, for allegedly embezzling approximately $50,000 from client trust funds. Due to various complications, including personnel changes and difficulty obtaining records, charges were not brought until January 2019. Defendant moved to dismiss, alleging the delay prejudiced her due to the unavailability of key documents. The trial judge who presided over the motion hearing in January 2020 orally denied it and asked the State to draft the order. This trial judge retired in October 2020. In September 2021, a new trial judge signed the order denying the motion to dismiss, with a notation that the order was issued by the previous trial judge and a citation to Rule 63 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant was subsequently convicted, and appealed.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeals concluded the second trial judge did not have the authority to sign the order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss. Because Rule 63, which allows a judge to perform the duties of another judge under certain circumstances, applies only to civil cases, “this issue is not governed by Rule 63.” Slip Op. at 10. The court also noted that “[t]he Rules of Criminal Procedure do not address the authority of one judge to enter an order on behalf of another judge in this context,” and the State did not provide any other authority in support. <em>Id</em>. at 11. Looking to <em>State v. Bartlett</em>, 368 N.C. 309 (2015), the court applied the principle that “the judge who presided at the hearing must make the findings of fact.” Slip Op. at 12. Because the second trial judge here did not have authority to enter the order denying defendant’s motion, the court vacated her conviction and remanded for a new hearing on the motion.</p>
<p>Judge Stading concurred by separate opinion, emphasizing “a tempered application of <em>State v. Bartlett</em>” as that case focused specifically on motion to suppress statutes. <em>Id</em>. at 14.</p>
<p><strong>No error when seating a new potential juror from the jury pool, as jury was not yet empaneled and potential members were not yet classified as jurors. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=43693">State v. Griffin</a>, COA24-156, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 5, 2025). In this Mecklenburg County case, defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon, arguing the trial court erred by seating a juror from the jury pool instead of elevating one of the prospective alternate jurors. The Court of Appeals found no error.</p>
<p>Defendant was indicted for first-degree murder, possession of a firearm by a felon, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon related to a 2018 armed robbery. During jury selection, twelve prospective jurors were selected, as well as two prospective alternate jurors. Before the jury was empaneled, prospective Juror No. 7 was excused due to his wife going into labor. The State argued that a new juror should be selected from the jury pool under G.S. 15A-1214(g). Defendant argued that one of the prospective alternate jurors should replace Juror No. 7, and then a new alternate juror should be selected. The trial court agreed with the State, and a new prospective juror was picked from the pool to replace the departing juror. The jury was then empaneled and ultimately found defendant guilty of first-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon.</p>
<p><strong> </strong>The Court of Appeals explained the core of the question on appeal as “whether those prospective, yet-to-be members of the to-be empaneled jury who have been accepted by each party, are properly classified as jurors or alternate jurors.” Slip Op. at 8. The text of G.S. 15A-1215 governs when an alternate juror becomes a juror, but to properly apply the statute in this situation the court was forced to determine the proper meaning of “juror.” Referencing <em>Garner’s Modern English Usage</em>, the court stated that a “juror” is someone who has been empaneled on the jury and distinguished this from a potential juror or veniremember who hasn’t yet been selected to sit on the jury. <em>Id</em>. at 8. The court held that G.S. 15A-1214(g) was controlling in this situation, as it permitted the trial court to substitute a new prospective juror when a juror that has been accepted but not empaneled is challenged for cause. Concluding the analysis, the court noted that since defendant did not argue or show prejudice on appeal, his “contentions as to statutory error are overruled.” <em>Id</em>. at 12. Defendant also attempted to argue that his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury was infringed, but the court held he failed to preserve this argument as he did not raise it at trial.</p>
<p><strong>Testimony from defendant’s psychologist did not establish the mitigating factor that his schizophrenia significantly reduced his culpability for the murder. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44274">State v. Rojas</a>, COA24-690, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 5, 2025). In this Gaston County case,<strong> d</strong>efendant appealed his aggravated sentence for second-degree murder, arguing that the sentencing judge erred in failing to find the statutory mitigating factor that he was suffering from a mental or physical condition that significantly reduced his culpability. The Court of Appeals found no error.</p>
<p>This matter previously reached the Court of Appeals in the unpublished <a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=40498"><em>State v. Rojas</em></a>, No. COA20-810. Defendant murdered his girlfriend in May 2016 by stabbing her over 100 times and leaving her to bleed to death in their bathtub. He was initially found incompetent to stand trial due to psychotic disorders but later deemed competent after psychiatric care. At the resentencing hearing (the original sentence having been vacated in the previous appeal), defendant presented testimony from a forensic psychiatrist who diagnosed him with schizophrenia. However, the psychiatrist stated he couldn’t testify with reasonable medical certainty whether schizophrenia contributed to the violent behavior at the time of the murder. Defendant also testified, blaming medication and hallucinations for his actions, but he offered no other expert testimony. The trial court found two aggravating factors (especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and taking advantage of a position of trust) and three mitigating factors (support system, positive employment history, and good treatment prognosis), but ultimately determined the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, imposing an aggravated sentence.</p>
<p><strong> </strong>On appeal, defendant argued that the sentencing court ignored the credible testimony of the forensic psychologist that he suffered from schizophrenia, and it contributed to his culpability for the crime. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that defendant could not show “substantial, uncontradicted, and manifestly credible evidence” of the mitigating factor as his “only expert witness could not, and did not, testify with reasonable medical certainty that defendant’s schizophrenia contributed to the murder or otherwise significantly reduced defendant’s culpability for the offense.” Slip Op. at 12. Therefore, the court held that the sentencing judge did not err in declining to find the mitigating factor.</p>
<p><strong>Testimony from police officer and forensic expert that substance appeared to be marijuana was properly admitted and supported defendant’s convictions, despite lack of testing confirming substance was not hemp. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44100">State v. Ruffin</a>, COA24-276, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 5, 2025). In this Martin County case, Defendant appealed his convictions for trafficking in heroin offenses, sale of marijuana, and delivery of marijuana, arguing several errors related to the trial court’s admission of testimony regarding the identification of marijuana and errors in sentencing. The Court of Appeals found no error.</p>
<p>In 2021, a confidential informant (CI) contacted defendant, seeking to buy seven grams of fentanyl “and some marijuana.” Slip Op. at 3. Defendant quoted prices for both, and the CI paid defendant and received two bags of the substances. Defendant was arrested shortly after leaving the scene. At trial, the detective who worked with the CI testified based on his training and experience that the plant material appeared to be marijuana. A forensic scientist from the state crime lab also testified about the plant material, concluding it was “plant material belonging to the genus cannabis containing tetrahydrocannabinol [THC].” <em>Id</em>. at 4. However, she also testified that the lab lacked the ability to distinguish between marijuana and hemp, and that it was possible the plant material was hemp. Defendant requested and the trial court provided a jury instruction stating that the term marijuana does not include hemp or hemp products. Defendant was subsequently convicted, and received <strong>consecutive</strong> sentences of 70 to 93 months for his offenses.</p>
<p>Taking up defendant’s arguments, the Court of Appeals first addressed whether it was error to allow the detective to testify that the plant material was marijuana as lay opinion testimony. Because defendant did not object to the testimony at trial, the Court reviewed for plain error. Referencing previous case law, the court noted that a police officer experienced in the identification of marijuana may testify to his visual identification of evidence as marijuana. Defendant pointed to <em>State v. Ward</em>, 364 N.C. 133 (2010), to argue that an officer’s visual identification is no longer reliable since the legalization of hemp. The Court distinguished <em>Ward</em>, noting “the standard for lay opinion testimony under Rule 701— including [the detective’s] testimony—is unchanged in light of <em>Ward</em>.” Slip Op. at 9. Subsequent caselaw also supported that “law enforcement officers may still offer lay opinion testimony identifying a substance as marijuana.” <em>Id</em>. As a result, the court found no error in admitting the testimony.</p>
<p>The court applied the same plain error analysis to the forensic expert’s testimony as defendant did not object to her testimony either. Because she was testifying as an expert under Rule 702, the court looked to <em>State v. Abrams</em>, 248 N.C. App. 639 (2016), to determine if the expert followed reliable procedures for identifying the substance as marijuana. The court was satisfied that the expert followed acceptable procedures as established by previous caselaw, and found the testimony reliable under Rule 702, meaning it was not error to admit her testimony.</p>
<p>Defendant also argued that it was error to deny his motion to dismiss because the State did not provide adequate evidence the substance was marijuana not hemp. The court disagreed, pointing to the testimony of the detective and forensic expert discussed above, as “our courts have consistently affirmed that testimony identifying a substance as marijuana—from a law enforcement officer as well as a forensic expert—is sufficient to take the matter to the jury.” <em>Id</em>. at 15.</p>
<p>Although the trial court used the appropriate pattern jury instruction, along with an alteration specifically requested by defendant, defendant argued it was error to omit instruction that “marijuana has a Delta-9 THC content in excess of 0.3%, while hemp has a Delta-9 THC content of 0.3% or less.” <em>Id</em>. at 18. Applying the plain error standard again, the court found no error, as the court held that the instruction given was an accurate statement of the law.</p>
<p>Finally, the court reached the sentencing issues, where defendant argued he was improperly sentenced for selling and delivering marijuana in the same transaction. The court concluded that any error if it existed was harmless, as “the trial court consolidated those convictions to run <em>concurrently </em>with the longer sentence for Trafficking in a Mixture Containing Heroin by Transportation.” <em>Id</em>. at 20. Defendant also argued that the prosecutor offered improper information that influenced sentencing considerations, as the prosecutor referenced a victim who died and a pending death by distribution charge against defendant. However, “the trial court here expressly rejected the prosecutor’s arguments regarding the separate charges on the Record and affirmatively stated that other charges would be considered in separate proceedings,” meaning there was no evidence that defendant received a sentence based on improper information. <em>Id</em>. at 25.</p>
<p><strong>Assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury may serve as the predicate for felony murder when defendant acted with actual intent to commit the act forming the basis of the murder charge; G.S. 20-166 is ambiguous regarding the unit of prosecution, leading the court to apply the rule of lenity and conclude the unit is per crash, not per victim. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44034">State v. Watlington</a>, COA23-1106, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 5, 2025). In this Guilford County case, two defendants, Watlington and Felton, both appealed from judgments entered after a trial where the defendants were tried jointly. Watlington was convicted of first-degree murder and additional felonies related to her attempts to run over multiple people at a gas station after a fight. Felton was convicted of eleven counts of accessory after the fact to Watlington’s convictions. The Court of Appeals arrested judgment on three of Watlington’s convictions for hit and run and three of Felton’s convictions for accessory after the fact to hit and run, but found no error with the other convictions, remanding for resentencing.</p>
<p>One early morning in October of 2019, Felton drove an SUV to a gas station in Greensboro, with Watlington as a passenger. After hitting a parked car, a confrontation ensued between Watlington, Felton, and the car’s owner. The argument escalated into a brawl involving multiple people over the course of twenty-five minutes, and testimony showed Felton was the primary aggressor. Around thirty minutes after the confrontation began, Watlington got into the driver’s seat of the SUV and backed over a group of people; it took her approximately ten seconds to completely run over the victims. After stopping completely clear of the victims, Watlington drove forward, running over the same group of people at full speed. Felton watched the entire incident without stopping Watlington, then stood over the victims yelling at them. One victim died at the scene, and several others sustained serious injuries. The two defendants drove away in the SUV but were apprehended nearby a short time later.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeals took up Watlington’s arguments on appeal first, beginning with her argument that it was error for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury to be the predicate felony for her first-degree murder conviction. In <em>State v. Jones</em>, 353 N.C. 159 (1994), the Supreme Court held that “[f]or assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury to serve as the predicate felony for a felony murder conviction . . . the individual must have acted with a ‘level of intent greater than culpable negligence.’” Slip Op. at 11 (quoting <em>Jones</em> at 167). Here, Watlington argued that Jones represented a “bright-line rule” that assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury could never be a predicate felony, an argument the court rejected. <em>Id</em>. Instead, the court explained that “assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, as a matter of law, can serve as the predicate felony for a felony murder conviction when the defendant acts with the ‘actual intent to commit the act that forms the basis of [the] first-degree murder charge.’”<em> Id</em>. at 13 (quoting <em>Jones</em> at 166). The trial court properly instructed the jury in this case, and the court noted that sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that Watlington acted intentionally when driving over the victims with the SUV. The court also rejected Watlington’s challenge to the jury instruction for felony murder and the lack of an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, finding no errors in the instruction given and no evidence to support an additional voluntary manslaughter instruction.</p>
<p>The court next considered Watlington’s argument regarding her multiple hit and run counts, and agreed that the structure of the statute did not support all the convictions. G.S. 20-166 “does not clarify whether its unit of prosecution is the conduct of leaving the scene of a crash or the number of victims injured as a result of the crash,” resulting in an ambiguity for the court to resolve. <em>Id</em>. at 18. Here the court applied the rule of lenity, interpreting the ambiguity in Watlington’s favor. The court explained that there were five victims, but only two crashes, one when Watlington backed over the victims and the second when Watlington drove forward over the victims. As a result, Watlington could only be convicted twice, “one conviction for Watlington’s conduct of leaving the scene of each crash,” and the court arrested judgment on the other three hit and run convictions. <em>Id</em>. at 21.</p>
<p>Arriving at Felton’s arguments, the court first dispensed with her argument that there was insufficient evidence to support her convictions for accessory after the fact. Here, evidence showed that Felton watched Watlington hit the victims with the SUV, then left the scene with her and took the keys to the SUV, concealing the identity of Watlington as the driver. The court found this evidence sufficient to support Felton’s convictions. The court also rejected Felton’s challenge to the language of her indictments, finding no fatal variance from the evidence at trial.</p>
<p>Felton argued that she should not be subject to multiple convictions for accessory after the fact; the court rejected this, explaining “the context of [G.S.] 14-7 clearly indicates that the legislature intended the allowable unit of prosecution to be each felony for which the principal committed and the accessory assisted after the fact.” <em>Id</em>. at 27. The court then considered Felton’s argument that she was convicted as accessory after the fact to hit and run for merely leaving the scene. Rejecting this argument, the court pointed to the many other aspects of Felton’s culpability after the crashes, including taking the SUV’s keys and concealing Watlington’s identity as the driver. However, the court arrested judgment on three of Felton’s convictions, as it had done for Watlington’s hit and run convictions discussed above.</p>
<p>Felton then challenged the jury instructions, arguing they provided a theory of guilt not alleged in the indictments, specifically that she assisted Watlington in attempting to escape. The court noted the circumstantial evidence of Felton possessing the SUV keys and that this did not represent a stand-alone theory of guilt, rejecting Felton’s argument. Finally, the court rejected Felton’s challenge to the closing argument, noting that law enforcement body cam footage supported the inference that Felton and Watlington were together when apprehended.</p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/case-summaries-n-c-court-of-appeals-march-5-2025/">Case Summaries: N.C. Court of Appeals (March 5, 2025)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu">North Carolina Criminal Law</a>.</p>
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		<title>Case Summaries: N.C. Court of Appeals (Feb. 19, 2025)</title>
		<link>https://www.disabilityandrepresentation.com/personal-injury-lawyer/case-summaries-n-c-court-of-appeals-feb-19-2025/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Phipps]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 24 Feb 2025 13:34:34 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[North Carolina]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Personal Injury Lawyer]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.disabilityandrepresentation.com/?p=56450</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on February 19, 2025. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present. Court rejected defendant’s argument that “serious injury” requires medical attention beyond an examination. [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on February 19, 2025. These summaries will be added to <a href="https://www.sog.unc.edu/sccc/">Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium</a>, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.<span id="more-19604"></span></p>
<p><strong>Court rejected defendant’s argument that “serious injury” requires medical attention beyond an examination. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44181">State v. Reaves</a>, COA24-663, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 19, 2025). In this Durham County case, defendant appealed his convictions for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, arguing error in denying his motion to dismiss because the victim’s injuries were not “serious” under G.S. 14-32(b). The Court of Appeals found no error.</p>
<p>In 2022, defendant and the victim, defendant’s on-and-off girlfriend, rekindled their relationship and the victim moved into defendant’s apartment. Their relationship soured and defendant became abusive towards the victim, culminating in September 2022 when defendant punched and kicked the victim and hit her with a curtain rod and the butt of his handgun. The victim eventually escaped by jumping from the balcony and running to a nearby mail carrier for help. At the hospital, an examination documented bruising, swelling, and tenderness on the victim’s body. At trial, the State called law enforcement, EMS, and a nurse from the hospital to testify to the victim’s injuries, and admitted photographs of her injuries and hospital reports.</p>
<p>On appeal, defendant argued that the State provided insufficient evidence of the severity of the victim’s injuries, pointing to <em>State v. Brunson</em>, 180 N.C. App. 188 (2006), and <em>State v. Ramseur</em>, 338 N.C. 502 (1994), and arguing “<em>Brunson</em> and <em>Ramseur</em> stand for the proposition that a serious injury, at a minimum, requires medical attention that goes beyond a mere cursory examination.” Slip Op. at 10. The Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument, explaining that North Carolina courts have declined to establish a threshold for serious injury, and to accept his argument here “would be to adopt a threshold requirement contrary to longstanding case law.” <em>Id</em>. After reviewing the record in this case, the court held that “[t]he State presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to decide whether Defendant inflicted serious injury upon [the victim].” <em>Id</em>. at 11.</p>
<p><strong>State offered adequate evidence to justify defendant’s term of SBM despite the lack of high-risk Static-99 score. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44238">State v. Belfield</a>, COA24-640, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 19, 2025). In this Nash County case, defendant appealed the order imposing a 25-year term of satellite-based monitoring (SBM), arguing error as defendant was not at high risk to reoffend and did not require the highest level of supervision and monitoring. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding no error.</p>
<p>In August of 2020, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of indecent liberties with a child and was sentenced; subsequently the trial court held a SBM hearing and determined defendant was subject to SBM. In <a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=42440"><em>State v. Belfield</em></a>, 289 N.C. App. 720 (2023) (unpublished), defendant appealed the SBM order, pointing out that the trial court’s order was on form AOC-CR-615, with a box checked indicating the decision was based on additional findings from “the attached form 618.” Slip Op. at 4 (cleaned up). This was significant as defendant’s Static-99 score was a four, which alone was not “high risk” and did not justify SBM, so the trial court had to consider additional evidence to justify the order. However, the order did not contain the referenced form 618, so the court vacated and remanded for the trial court to make findings of fact regarding the imposition of SBM. In October of 2023, the trial court heard the matter, considering the evidence from the previous SBM hearing and entered new findings, again imposing SBM. Defendant appealed that order, leading to the current decision.</p>
<p>Taking up defendant’s appeal a second time, the Court of Appeals explained that when, as here, a defendant does not have a “high risk” Static-99 score, the State must offer additional evidence, and the trial court must make additional findings, to justify a SBM sentence. Defendant argued that the trial court’s additional findings in this case were based upon “the trial court’s consideration of improperly duplicative evidence of matters already addressed in Defendant’s Static-99 risk assessment.” <em>Id</em>. at 11. The court disagreed with defendant, noting that while “additional findings cannot be based solely on matters already addressed in the Static99 risk assessment,” four of the additional findings here were supported by “competent evidence other than that of a defendant’s risk assessment” and justified the imposition of SBM. <em>Id</em>.</p>
<p><strong>Trial court’s failure to consider stipulated mitigating factor justified remand for resentencing. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44195">State v. Curtis</a>, COA24-204, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 19, 2025). In this Wake County case, defendant appealed after pleading guilty to felony death by vehicle, felony serious injury by vehicle, and driving while impaired, challenging the sentencing he received for his convictions. The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded for resentencing.</p>
<p>In January of 2022, defendant caused a head-on collision that killed two passengers in the other vehicle and injured several more. Officers found used nitrous oxide containers in the vehicle, and defendant admitted to also using alcohol and marijuana the evening of the collision. Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to an agreement that avoided second-degree murder; the State stipulated to a mitigating factor that defendant “has accepted responsibility for [his] criminal conduct.” Slip Op. at 3. Defendant waived his right to appeal in the plea agreement. However, along with his appeal in this case, defendant filed a writ of certiorari, which the Court of Appeals granted to consider this case. The State did not oppose defendant’s writ and conceded that an error was committed.</p>
<p>Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court failed to consider his mitigating factor that he and the State stipulated to in the plea agreement. The Court of Appeals agreed, quoting <em>State v. Albert</em>, 312 N.C. 567, 579 (1985), for the proposition that “when the State stipulates to the facts supporting the finding of a mitigating factor, ‘the trial court err[s] in failing to find this fact in mitigation.’” Slip Op. at 7. Defendant also argued he was entitled to a different trial judge on remand. The court disagreed on that point, noting that the trial judge was not exposed to any prejudicial information beyond the plea agreement, and defendant could not demonstrate a risk to his bargained-for agreement if the case was remanded to the same judge. Thus the court vacated and remanded to the trial court for resentencing.</p>
<p><strong>Underlying felony of AWDWIKISI supported felony murder conviction despite defendant’s merger doctrine argument; discussion of robbery attempt did not represent double jeopardy; evidence of defendant’s convictions and gang affiliations were properly excluded. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=43455">State v. Greenfield</a>, COA23-597, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 19, 2025). In this New Hanover County case, defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury (AWDWIKISI), arguing error in (1) jury instructions regarding felony murder, (2) permitting the State to contend defendant committed robbery when he was previously acquitted, (3) improperly excluding evidence of the victim’s convictions and gang affiliations, and (4) not intervening in the State’s closing argument. The Court of Appeals found no error.</p>
<p>In February of 2015, defendant went to the apartment shared by the murder victim and his girlfriend to buy marijuana. An argument ensued, and both parties produced firearms. Testimony differed on what happened next, but defendant ended up shooting and killing the victim, and hitting the girlfriend with gunfire as well. Defendant went to trial in 2017 and was convicted of first-degree murder and AWDWIKISI, but acquitted of attempted robbery. Defendant appealed, and in <em>State v. Greenfield</em>, 375 N.C. 434 (2020), the Supreme Court granted defendant a new trial because the trial court did not provide instructions on self-defense and transferred intent. Defendant was retried in 2022 and again convicted, leading to the current case.</p>
<p>In (1), defendant argued that the jury instructions improperly allowed the jury to find him guilty of felony murder without the requisite intent, as the underlying felony was AWDWIKISI for the girlfriend, and defendant argued he was aiming for the murder victim and accidentally hit the girlfriend. The Court of Appeals explained that defendant’s argument rested on an interpretation of the “merger doctrine,” where the assault on a victim cannot be the underlying felony for felony murder of that victim. Here, the jury received instruction on transferred intent, where if defendant intended to harm one victim and instead harmed another, the legal effect would be the same. The court rejected defendant’s interpretation of the situation, explaining “this is not a case where the assault of a single victim resulted in the death of the same single victim.” Slip Op. at 14. Instead, the court found that the trial court’s instructions were correct and did not present the matter in a way that would mislead the jury.</p>
<p>For (2), defendant argued that allowing the State to introduce evidence and argument about the robbery charge represented double jeopardy; because defendant failed to preserve the majority of his objection, the court only considered whether it was error to allow the State to discuss the robbery in closing argument. The court looked to <em>State v. Agee</em>, 326 N.C. 542 (1990), as “both cases involve a continuous series of events that resulted in an acquittal for one charge at a prior trial,” explaining “[t]he State’s discussion of robbery was only used to explain the chain of events that led to the intentional shooting of [the murder victim and his girlfriend].” Slip Op. at 19-20. Based on applicable precedent, allowing this discussion was proper and “whether or not a robbery occurred, the evidence was without objection and tended to explain the chain of events leading to the shooting.” <em>Id</em>.</p>
<p>Reaching (3), the court parsed whether the exclusion of the murder victim’s prior convictions, gang affiliation, thug tattoo, and possession of assault rifles were properly excluded. Defendant argued this in two ways, first that the murder victim was the actual aggressor, and second that the evidence was admissible to rebut evidence of the victim’s peaceable character and gun habits. The court rejected both. First, the court noted these arguments had been rejected previously when defendant appealed his first conviction, but again noted that Rule of Evidence 403 and 405(b) did not support admission under these circumstances. The court then rejected defendant’s arguments about the gun habits and peaceable character, noting defendant was able to testify regarding some of the guns in the home, and the excluded evidence of firearms was not relevant. Regarding the peaceable character of defendant, the court explained that the evidence identified by defendant “does not go to [the victim’s] character for peacefulness and are not pertinent character traits as to whether the [victim] was violent.” <em>Id</em>. at 30. This led the court to conclude that “the testimony cited by Defendant does not open the door to rebuttal evidence of [the victim’s] character for violence.” <em>Id</em>. at 31.</p>
<p>Finally in (4), the court dispensed with defendant’s argument that a detective and prosecutors were permitted to give improper and prejudicial opinions on defendant’s credibility and guilt. The court looked for plain error as defendant did not object at trial. First the court looked at the detective’s testimony, where the detective testified he did not believe defendant acted in self-defense, and noted that the detective “was explaining why he brought that up in his interviews with Defendant” as it was a strategy to keep defendant talking and not a comment on the ultimate issue of self-defense in the case. <em>Id</em>. at 37. The court then looked at the statements made in closing argument, noting that the prosecutor did not explicitly call defendant a liar but instead highlighted the various stories he gave throughout the investigation about the events. The court found no issues justifying intervention <em>ex mero motu</em> and overruled defendant’s arguments.</p>
<p><strong>Possession of a firearm by a felon under G.S. 14-415.1 was not facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied to defendant’s case; defendant’s statements showing racial motivation were properly admitted. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44211">State v. Nanes</a>, COA24-487, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 19, 2025). In this Wake County case, defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon, arguing (1) G.S. 14-415.1, the statute making possession of a firearm by a felon an offense, was unconstitutional, and (2) error in admitting defendant’s own statements. The Court of Appeals held G.S. 14-415.1 was constitutional and found no error.</p>
<p>During August of 2020, defendant shot and killed two victims he had never met, one in Raleigh and another in Cary. Defendant’s probation officer recognized a BOLO put out by police, and reported him, leading to his arrest. Defendant had previously been convicted of felony animal cruelty for stealing his parent’s dog and decapitating it with a knife. At trial, the State offered statements from defendant made during a phone call with his mother, where she questioned why he posted a picture of a firearm on social media despite being convicted of a felony. Defendant responded “[t]his is a hard time for our country, and you’ve got racist black people out here.” Slip Op. at 18.</p>
<p>In (1), defendant argued that G.S. 14-415.1 was unconstitutional both facially and as-applied to his situation, pointing to <em>N.Y. State Rifle &amp; Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen</em>, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and <em>United States v. Rahimi</em>, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), to support his arguments. The Court of Appeals began with the facial challenge, noting “the State must only show that section 14-415.1 ‘is constitutional in some of its applications.’” Slip Op. at 6 (quoting <em>Rahimi</em> at 693). The court acknowledged that G.S. 14-415.1 regulated some conduct covered by the Second Amendment, but concluded the section was “sufficiently analogous to historical laws to show that prohibiting convicted felons from possessing firearms is within the nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation.” <em>Id</em>. at 6-7. Because G.S. 14-415.1 could be “applied constitutionally to numerous circumstances” the court found no merit in defendant’s facial challenge. <em>Id</em>. at 10.</p>
<p>Moving to the as-applied constitutional challenge, defendant argued his felony did not represent violent crime against a person, and therefore shouldn’t justify disarming him. The court again disagreed, noting that beheading the dog was a violent crime, and “the record reflects Defendant has a history of victimizing others resulting in convictions for: assault on a government official or employee, simple assault, simple assault again, assault inflicting serious injury, assault on a handicapped person, and assault and battery.” <em>Id</em>. at 11. This led the court to conclude defendant had a history of violence towards others, and removing his right to possess a firearm was well within historical tradition. The court also considered defendant’s arguments under Section 30 of the North Carolina Constitution, applying the five-factor framework from <em>Britt v. State</em>, 363 N.C. 546, (2009). After performing the analysis the court concluded “the <em>Britt</em> factors undoubtedly weigh in favor of upholding the application of section 14-415.1 against Defendant as he has a demonstrated history of violence, victimizing others, and disregarding the law.” Slip Op. at 16.</p>
<p>Arriving at (2), the court explained “[t]he State’s theory of the case was that, because both victims were peaceful individuals whom Defendant had never met that happened to be people of color, the murders were committed out of racial animus on Defendant’s part.” <em>Id</em>. at 18. This made defendant’s comments relevant and probative of his motive for the murders under Rule of Evidence 401. The court then looked to the Rule of Evidence 403 balancing test, concluding the trial court adequately balanced the prejudicial effect with the probative value. The court noted that several of defendant’s statements that were more inflammatory were excluded, and even if it were error to admit the statements, overwhelming evidence supported defendant’s guilt in the matter, meaning he could not demonstrate the jury would have reached a different result without the statement in evidence.</p>
<p><strong>Jury instructions on aiding and abetting properly framed the responsibility of defendant as the biological parent of the victim. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44269">State v. Velasco</a>, COA24-333, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 19, 2025). In this Johnston County case, defendant appealed her convictions for first-degree forcible rape, first-degree forcible sexual offense, sexual servitude of a child victim, and incest of her daughter, arguing error in (1) omitting a parenthetical phrase from the pattern jury instructions for flight, and (2) instructing the jury on aiding and abetting. The Court of Appeals held that defendant waived (1), and found no error in (2).</p>
<p>In 2020, defendant and her husband lived separately from her daughters, who lived with their father, defendant’s ex-husband. Defendant maintained communication with her daughters, and in August 2020, two of her daughters snuck out of their father’s house to spend the night with defendant at her apartment. While there, defendant gave her daughters alcohol and partied with them, although both were underage. The older daughter and victim in the case became sick at one point, and defendant took her to lay down in a bedroom where her husband was also present. At that point, defendant’s husband began touching the victim in a sexual manner, and defendant returned to the bedroom with a pair of scissors, telling her husband “I know you want to.  You can do it.” Slip Op. at 4. The husband used the scissors to cut off the victim’s underwear, and he began raping the victim. Defendant returned to the bedroom and began taking pictures with her cellphone. Eventually, defendant told her husband to stop and brought the victim clothes, and in the morning they drove the daughters back to their father’s house. After the victim reported the incident, defendant was brought to trial and eventually convicted.</p>
<p>Taking up (1), defendant argued it was error to omit the first sentence of N.C.P.I-Crim. 104.35, the pattern instruction on flight. Defendant did not object at trial, and although the Court of Appeals may review instructional errors that were not objected to for plain error, the defendant must “specifically and distinctly” argue the error was plain error under Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(a)(4). <em>Id</em>. at 11. Here, defendant did not and the argument was waived, leading the court to dismiss it.</p>
<p>Moving to (2), defendant argued that it was plain error to instruct the jury on aiding and abetting the crimes as the instruction was based solely on defendant being the victim’s biological mother. The court explained that the objected-to instruction “Aiding and Abetting – Parent” which instructed the jury that a parent who is present and fails to take all steps to protect their child from attack or sexual assault is subject to conviction based on aiding and abetting. <em>Id</em>. at 15. The instruction specifically pointed to <em>State v. Walden</em>, 306 N.C. 466 (1982), where the Supreme Court established parents have a “duty to take every step reasonably possible under the circumstances of a given situation to prevent harm to their children.” Slip Op. at 16 (quoting <em>Walden</em> at 475). However, the court noted a caveat that “one may not be found to be an aider and abettor” solely because they are present, and thus evidence must show “the defendant said or did something showing [their] consent to the criminal purpose and contribution to its execution.” <em>Id</em>. at 16-17 (quoting <em>Walden </em>at 476). Here, the court noted that even if the instruction provided did not fully capture the caveat from <em>Walden</em>, the State provided evidence showing defendant took actions and made statements showing her consent, highlighting that defendant told her husband “you can do it” and bringing him scissors, taking photographs while he raped her daughter, and providing alcohol and marijuana gummies to her daughters while they were underage. As a result, defendant could not show plain error.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/case-summaries-n-c-court-of-appeals-feb-19-2025/">Case Summaries: N.C. Court of Appeals (Feb. 19, 2025)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu">North Carolina Criminal Law</a>.</p>
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		<title>Case Summaries: N.C. Court of Appeals (Feb. 5, 2025)</title>
		<link>https://www.disabilityandrepresentation.com/nc-legal-news/case-summaries-n-c-court-of-appeals-feb-5-2025/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Phipps]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 10 Feb 2025 14:26:11 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[North Carolina]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.disabilityandrepresentation.com/?p=52242</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on February 5, 2025. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present. (1) Trial court failed to articulate findings on speedy trial motion, justifying remand; [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on February 5, 2025. These summaries will be added to <a href="https://www.sog.unc.edu/sccc/">Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium</a>, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.<span id="more-19576"></span></p>
<p><strong>(1) Trial court failed to articulate findings on speedy trial motion, justifying remand; (2) decision not to inquire further into juror who allegedly fell asleep was within trial court’s discretion; (3) omission during clarification of jury instructions did not rise to plain error. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44159">State v. Boyd</a>, COA 24-36, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 5, 2025). In this Pasquotank County case, defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder, possession of a firearm by a felon, and interfering with an electronic monitoring device, arguing error in (1) violation of his right to a speedy trial, (2) failure to inquire or replace a juror who fell asleep, and (3) giving clarification of jury instructions. The Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of the relevant factors in (1), but found no error with (2)-(3).</p>
<p>In October of 2020, the victim was found shot to death in a parked vehicle at an Elizabeth City apartment complex. Witnesses observed the victim and another man, later identified as defendant, arguing in the parking lot before the shooting. Defendant was arrested in New York in November 2020 and was held until his trial in March of 2023. During this time, defendant filed two motions for speedy trial and a motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial rights, all of which the trial court denied. During the trial, one juror was observed closing her eyes and apparently sleeping, but the trial court denied the request to replace the juror with an alternate. During jury deliberations, the jurors sent a request for clarification of the difference between first- and second-degree murder, and the trial court provided an explanation involving “premeditation and deliberation.” Slip Op. at 7. Defense counsel argued that this instruction left out “intent to kill” but the trial court declined to further instruct the jury. <em>Id</em>.</p>
<p>Taking up (1), the Court of Appeals looked to <em>Barker v. Wingo</em>, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and North Carolina precedent adopting the <em>Barker</em> factors for speedy trial violations, noting that “when a delay approaches a year, it is enough to cause concern that the delay may be unreasonable and to trigger examination of all four <em>Barker</em> factors.” <em>Id</em>. at 11. In the current case, the trial court held a hearing in November of 2022 on the motion to dismiss, but the trial court did not reduce its findings to a written order or articulate findings under the <em>Barker </em>factors. Because the trial court’s oral statements did not show conclusions on “the issue of presumptive prejudice” or “whether the trial court ever considered any of the <em>Barker</em> factors,” the court remanded for a determination with findings of fact and conclusions of law. Slip Op. at 13.</p>
<p>Considering (2), the court explained that “[t]he trial court sits in the best position to evaluate the significance of the allegation against the juror” and here, the trial court “acted within its discretion in declining to conduct further inquiry.” <em>Id</em>. at 15. The court found no error in declining to investigate further in the current case.</p>
<p>Reaching (3), the court noted that “[t]he trial court omitted . . . the intent to kill requirement when giving the final mandate, a summary of the charge, to the jury before sending them back to deliberations.” <em>Id</em>. at 16. Applying the plain error standard, the court found no error, as the instruction was “incomplete” but not contradictory, and significant evidence showed defendant’s guilt. <em>Id</em>. at 18.</p>
<p><strong>Trial court did not err by removing a juror and an alternate who discussed the case at a snack bar. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44185">State v. Nobles</a>, COA 24-458, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 5, 2025). In this Cumberland County case, defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing a juror and an alternate juror. The Court of Appeals found no error.</p>
<p>In January of 2022, a motorcyclist pulled up next to defendant and his son at a stoplight. After an argument between the motorcyclist and defendant’s son, defendant shot the motorcyclist. During defendant’s trial, the trial court announced that several jurors had been overheard discussing the case at the snack bar, in violation of the jury instructions. The trial court examined the jurors in question and heard testimony from a witness who claimed she overheard the discussion and made a recording. The trial court ultimately removed one juror and one alternate, allowing a third juror to remain.</p>
<p>On appeal, defendant argued that “the removal of a juror, which he contends was arbitrary, prejudiced him <em>per se</em> when the trial court refused to reopen <em>voir dire</em>.” Slip Op. at 6. The Court of Appeals noted this was a novel argument, as defendant did not argue the initial <em>voir dire</em> was defective, but instead that he was prejudiced by the alternate juror system. The court noted defendant failed to show any prejudice as the alternate juror was selected during the initial <em>voir dire</em> process along with the rest of the jury. As a result, the court found no abuse of discretion and rejected defendant’s argument.</p>
<p><strong>Trial court’s failure to hold evidentiary hearing on defendant’s MARs justified remand as factual issues about defendant’s guilty plea remained unresolved; sex-offender registration was collateral consequence of guilty plea, but mandatory term of post-release supervision was direct consequence of plea. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=44194">State v. Spry</a>, COA24-129, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 5, 2025). In this Guilford County case, defendant appealed the denial of his motions for appropriate relief (MARs), arguing error in summarily denying his MARs challenging the entry of his guilty plea. The Court of Appeals agreed, vacating the denials and remanding for an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact on defendant’s MARs.</p>
<p>In 2006, defendant was indicted for a robbery at a restaurant, and the charges included second-degree kidnapping and attempted kidnapping of two victims under sixteen years old. Defendant pleaded guilty to three charges and received an active sentence of imprisonment with nine months of post-release supervision; the trial court did not identify the offenses as reportable convictions. Afterwards, the Combined Records Section of North Carolina Department of Correction requested that the trial court clarify the ages of the kidnapping victims, and “[w]ithout prior notice nor Defendant being present, the trial court entered a ‘corrected’ judgment . . . indicating ‘the above designated offense(s) is a reportable conviction involving a minor.  G.S. 14-208.6.’” Slip Op. at 2. This change required defendant to register as a sex offender and also required five years of post-release supervision. In defendant’s first MAR, he argued he did not learn of this change until right before his release from prison. The trial court denied defendant’s MARs without holding an evidentiary hearing.</p>
<p>Reviewing the MARs, the Court of Appeals highlighted that the issues before the trial court required settling factual disputes, and thus the trial court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. The record before the court did not contain a verbatim recording of defendant’s entry of his guilty plea, limiting the court’s ability to consider defendant’s claims. This required the court to remand for an evidentiary hearing and to vacate the previous rulings on the MARs.</p>
<p>Going further, the court also considered whether the sex-offender registration and post-release supervision were direct or collateral consequences of defendant’s guilty plea, as failure to advise defendant of direct consequences would render his guilty plea involuntary. Regarding sex-offender registration, the court held that “sex offender registration is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea to a crime requiring registration.” <em>Id</em>. at 14. However, the court held that “post-release supervision is distinguishable from . . . sex offender registration” and represented a direct consequence of the guilty plea. <em>Id</em>. at 19. The court directed the trial court to consider defendant’s arguments regarding his post-release supervision to determine whether his plea was entered “voluntarily, intelligently and understandingly.” <em>Id</em>. at 21.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/case-summaries-n-c-court-of-appeals-feb-5-2025/">Case Summaries: N.C. Court of Appeals (Feb. 5, 2025)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu">North Carolina Criminal Law</a>.</p>
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		<title>Case Summaries: N.C. Supreme Court (Jan. 31, 2025)</title>
		<link>https://www.disabilityandrepresentation.com/nc-legal-news/case-summaries-n-c-supreme-court-jan-31-2025/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Phipps]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Feb 2025 16:06:08 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[North Carolina]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.disabilityandrepresentation.com/?p=50488</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the Supreme Court of North Carolina released on January 31, 2025. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present. North Carolina Constitution’s Article I, Section 27 prohibition of cruel or unusual punishments [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the Supreme Court of North Carolina released on January 31, 2025. These summaries will be added to <a href="https://www.sog.unc.edu/sccc/">Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium</a>, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.<span id="more-19557"></span></p>
<p><strong>North Carolina Constitution’s Article I, Section 27 prohibition of cruel or unusual punishments did not provide greater protection to defendant than the U.S. Constitution’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=1&amp;pdf=44409">State v. Tirado</a>, 267PA21, ___ N.C. ___ (Jan. 31, 2025). In this Cumberland County case, the Supreme Court majority affirmed an unpublished Court of Appeals decision denying defendant’s constitutional challenge to his sentences of life without parole for murders committed while he was a juvenile.</p>
<p>In August of 1998, defendant was seventeen years old, and a member of the Crips gang, when he participated in the abduction and robbery of three women; defendant and the gang killed two of the women, but one woman survived. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, but the sentence was reduced to two consecutive life sentences without parole after the holding in <em>Roper v. Simmons</em>, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), that sentencing juvenile offenders to death was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court subsequently held in <em>Miller v. Alabama</em>, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), that a mandated life without parole sentence for a juvenile was unconstitutional, but permitted sentencing where the trial court had discretion to impose a lesser sentence. Defendant was resentenced in accordance with the <em>Miller</em>-fix statute adopted by the General Assembly, resulting in the imposition of two consecutive terms of life without parole in March 2020. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentences in the unpublished decision <a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&amp;pdf=40262"><em>State v. Tirado</em></a>, COA20-213 (June 15, 2021), leading to the current opinion.</p>
<p>On appeal, defendant argued that Article I, Section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution was more protective than the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and his sentences were cruel or unusual punishments and unconstitutional under North Carolina law. The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that the Cruel or Unusual Punishment clause in the North Carolina Constitution prohibited imposing sentences beyond those authorized by law. The Court reached this conclusion by conducting a historical analysis of the clause along with Article XI, which provides a list of acceptable punishments and has no analogue in the U.S. Constitution. Summarizing the function of these two provisions, the Court noted:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Because a constitution cannot violate itself, we must construe Article I, Section 27’s proscription of cruel or unusual punishments and Article XI’s enumeration of acceptable punishments harmoniously. Logically, therefore, the punishments the people sanctioned in Article XI, Sections 1 and 2 are inherently not “cruel or unusual” in a constitutional sense. Accordingly, an act of the General Assembly cannot violate the Cruel or Unusual Punishments Clause by prescribing a punishment allowable under Article XI, Sections 1 and 2, and similarly, judges cannot violate Article I, Section 27, by handing down a sentence in obedience to such an act.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Slip Op. at 32 (cleaned up). Although defendant argued the North Carolina Constitution was more protective, the Court explained that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause provided more protection in modern jurisprudence and concluded the Court of Appeals properly evaluated and decided defendant’s appeal in light of the protections afforded by both.</p>
<p>The Court also determined that the trial court’s sentence complied with <em>State v. Kelliher</em>, 381 N.C. 558 (2022), as that opinion was released after defendant’s appeal. First the Court noted defendant’s case did not meet the criteria of that opinion because “<em>Kelliher </em>applies only to juvenile homicide offenders whom the trial court (1) expressly finds to be neither incorrigible nor irredeemable and (2) sentences to multiple, consecutive terms of life with parole.” Slip Op. at 43. Then the Court clarified that a portion of the <em>Kelliher</em> opinion was obiter dictum, as “the statement requiring the trial court to make an express finding of incorrigibility before sentencing a defendant to life without parole was unnecessary in determining the outcome of the case.” <em>Id</em>. at 44.</p>
<p>Justice Berger, joined by Justices Barringer and Allen, concurred but wrote separately to express concerns with the <em>Kelliher</em> opinion and the precedential weight to which it is entitled. <em>Id</em>. at 46.</p>
<p>Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, concurred in the result only and argued that the majority’s assertions regarding Article I, Section 27 were unnecessary and should be interpreted as dicta. <em>Id</em>. at 50.</p>
<p><strong>Computer-generated phone records were not testimonial in nature and did not implicate the Confrontation Clause </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=1&amp;pdf=44414">State v. Lester</a>, 293PA23-2, ___ N.C. ___ (Jan. 31, 2025). In this Wake County case, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision holding the State violated the Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules by admitting exhibits of Verizon phone records. The Supreme Court held that if the records were truly machine generated, they were not hearsay or testimonial in nature, and remanded the case for the consideration of defendant’s remaining issues.</p>
<p>In 2022, defendant came to trial for statutory rape of a child fifteen years or younger. During the State’s case, two detectives testified about their investigation into defendant, and they referenced exhibits of phone records provided by Verizon. The two exhibits in question were a list of “the time, date, and connecting phone number for all calls to and from [defendant’s] phone between May and July 2019” and a cover letter stating the records were “true and accurate copies of the records created from the information maintained by Verizon in the actual course of business.” Slip Op. at 6. Defendant objected to the exhibits, and the State argued the records were admissible under Rule of Evidence 803(6) as business records. The trial court did not admit the records under Rule 803(6), but instead under Rule 803(24), the residual exception, as the trial court felt the State did not lay a proper foundation for business records. In <em>State v. Lester</em>, 291 N.C. App. 480 (2023), the Court of Appeals reversed defendant’s conviction, holding that admitting the records was a violation of defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights and the error was prejudicial, justifying a new trial.</p>
<p>Taking up the arguments, the Court explained that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to protect against the unreliable nature of out-of-court testimonial statements made by humans, specifically “<em>ex parte</em> examinations” offered against the accused. Slip Op. at 11. Here, the evidence in question was computer-generated data, and the Court noted this was not the type of evidence contemplated by the Confrontation Clause. After explaining the unique nature of machine-generated data and why it was more reliable that a human witness’s out-of-court statement, the Court held that ‘machine-generated raw data, if truly machine-generated,’ are ‘neither hearsay nor testimonial’ under the Confrontation Clause.” <em>Id</em>. at 17 (quoting <em>State v. Ortiz-Zape</em>, 367 N.C. 1, 10 (2013)). The Court emphasized  that “we focus here on data produced entirely by the internal operations of a computer or other machine, free from human input or intervention” in contrast to “(1) computer-stored evidence, and (2) human interpretations of computer-produced data.” <em>Id</em>. at 18. Because the machine-generated data did not implicate the Confrontation Clause in the same way that human interpretations of the data would, the Court determined the Court of Appeals improperly analyzed the admissibility of the exhibits in the current case.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/case-summaries-n-c-supreme-court-jan-31-2025/">Case Summaries: N.C. Supreme Court (Jan. 31, 2025)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu">North Carolina Criminal Law</a>.</p>
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