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O’er the Ramparts: Sizing Up the Castle Doctrine in State v. Carwile and State v. Williams

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The castle doctrine statute, G.S. 14-51.2, provides that it is presumptively reasonable for the lawful occupant of a home or motor vehicle to respond to an intruder with deadly force. State v. Phillips, 386 N.C. 513, 527 (2024). Two recent decisions examine the scope of this protection. In State v. Carwile, No. COA23-885 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2024), the Court of Appeals held that the castle doctrine did not apply when the defendant was outside his home. By contrast, in State v. Williams, COA24-50 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2024), the Court of Appeals held the castle doctrine did apply though the defendant was outside of his car. This post seeks to harmonize Carwile and Williams.

The Castle Doctrine Statute

Until 1993, the law of self-defense in North Carolina was governed largely by the common law. Enacted in 1993, G.S. 14-51.1 broadened the common law defense of habitation to justify the use of force not only to prevent but also to terminate an unlawful entry. State v. Blue, 356 N.C. 79, 89 (2002). In 2011, however, the legislature repealed G.S. 14-51.1 and enacted our current defensive force statutes, G.S. 14-51.2, -51.3 and -51.4. See State v. Kuhns, 260 N.C. App. 281, 285 (2018).

Under G.S. 14-51.2, the lawful occupant of a home, motor vehicle, or workplace is presumed to have had a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm when using deadly force if (1) an intruder was unlawfully and forcefully entering, and (2) the occupant knew it. G.S. 14-51.2(b). The presumption is rebuttable and does not apply in five enumerated circumstances, including when the intruder has exited the premises and discontinued all efforts to enter. Id. at (c)(5). Under the castle doctrine, excessive force is impossible unless the State rebuts the statutory presumption by proving one of the five circumstances prescribed. State v. Phillips, 386 N.C. 513, 527 (2024).

State v. Carwile

In State v. Carwile, the defendant, his wife, and Joshua Chinault were inside a home on September 4, 2018, when Christopher Easter entered, wearing a mask and wielding a chainsaw. Easter struck the defendant with the chainsaw. The defendant pushed Easter out of the house, and the two men fought while they crossed the yard. Easter dropped the chainsaw, raised his hands, and backed into a used car dealership lot about five hundred yards from the home. The defendant, his wife, and Chinault pursued him. Easter fell to the ground, and the defendant beat him to death. Carwile, Slip Op. 1-3.

The defendant was tried for first-degree murder and convicted of second-degree murder. On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the castle doctrine. In particular, he claimed that the trial court should have advised the jury that his fear for his life was presumptively reasonable. Carwile, Slip Op. 5.

The Court of Appeals disagreed. It recognized that, under G.S. 14-51.2, “a person has a presumptively reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm when another seeks to unlawfully and forcefully enter that person’s home while he is present.” Carwile, Slip Op. 8. But the presumption does not apply in certain circumstances, including when the intruder has exited and discontinued all efforts to enter. Id. at 8-9 (citing G.S. 14-51.2(c)(5)). Here it was undisputed that, at the time the defendant used deadly force against Easter, Easter had exited the home. Further, it was evident that Easter had also discontinued all efforts to enter the home. The Court of Appeals noted in particular (1) that Easter was not moving toward the defendant or the home, (2) that there was a period of time when there was a distance between Easter and the defendant, and (3) that the defendant continued his attack while Easter lay motionless on the ground. It concluded that Easter had discontinued all efforts to enter the home, and the Castle Doctrine did not apply. Id. at 10-11.

State v. Williams

The defendant in State v. Williams was sitting in his car talking with his passenger, Miracle Lewis, when her ex-boyfriend Martin Penny approached the car. Williams, Slip Op. 2. Penny opened the passenger side door, leaned in, and began punching the defendant. Id. at 4-5. The defendant exited the car. Penny withdrew from the car, came around the front, and met the defendant in the street. Penny thereupon continued his attack, and the defendant shot him twice, killing Penny. Id. at 6.

At the defendant’s murder trial, he requested an instruction under the castle doctrine statute. The trial court refused, reasoning the statute applies to an occupant, and the car was not occupied at the time of the shooting. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter. Williams, Slip Op. 7-8.

On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to instruct on the castle doctrine. To warrant such an instruction, the Court of Appeal said, the evidence had to show (1) the defendant was an occupant of the vehicle, and (2) Penny had unlawfully and forcefully entered. Williams, Slip Op. 15. The Court of Appeals found the term “occupant” ambiguous, but concluded – based on “the language, object, and spirit” of the statute – that the lawful occupant of a home, vehicle, or workplace need not remain within in order to invoke the statute’s protection. Id. at 24.

Applying this interpretation, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court erred in finding the defendant was not an occupant of the vehicle at the pertinent time. Williams, Slip Op. 28. It further found that Penny had unlawfully and forcefully entered the car and the defendant knew it. It followed that the defendant was entitled to a Castle Doctrine instruction. Id. at 29. As for the State’s argument that Penny had exited and discontinued all efforts to enter the vehicle, the Court of Appeals said this was a question for the jury, “and one which we will not consider on appeal.” Id. at 31. The error was prejudicial, it held, and the defendant was entitled to a new trial. Id. at 32.

Conclusion

The concept of occupancy has proved troublesome before. Domestic criminal trespass occurs when a person makes an unauthorized entry into a premises “occupied” by an estranged partner. G.S. 14-134.3(a). In State v. Vetter, 257 N.C. App. 915 (2018), the Court of Appeals addressed the argument that there was no domestic criminal trespass when the victim was not physically present at the time of the entry. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument, reasoning that the harm sought to be prevented, namely the infliction of mental distress, can occur whether the victim is physically present or not. Id. at 926. This sort of occupancy was distinguished from occupancy for purposes of discharging a firearm into occupied property, G.S. 14-34.1, or secret peeping, G.S. 14-202, where the harm “could not logically occur absent the victim’s physical presence at the time.” Id.

The prevailing understanding has been that the harm sought to be prevented by the defense of habitation is danger to one physically present inside the premises. As counsel noted in Carwile, defense of habitation did not apply because the killing occurred outside of the home. Carwile, Slip Op. 3-4. The trial court in Williams ruled the statutory privilege under G.S. 14-51.2 was similarly inapplicable because no one was inside the car at the time of the shooting. Williams, Slip Op. 7-8. But the decision in Carwile did not turn on the fact that the killing occurred outside of the home; rather, the Court of Appeals there found sufficient evidence the victim had exited and discontinued all efforts to enter (the same issue Williams declined to consider). For its part, Williams challenges the prevailing understanding by extending the protection of the statute to one outside the premises.

For practitioners, the takeaway is that occupancy for purposes of G.S. 14-51.2 has both a temporal and spatial dimension. If the protection extends beyond the ramparts – and Williams says it does – then the limitation lies in other circumstances. As shown in Carwile, it does not permit a person no longer under attack to pursue an intruder into an adjoining property and kill him there.

The post O’er the Ramparts: Sizing Up the Castle Doctrine in State v. Carwile and State v. Williams appeared first on North Carolina Criminal Law.

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